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Abstract
We provide a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between public debt
and GDP growth in the postwar advanced economies. We use the timing of changes
in public debt and growth to account for endogeneity, and find little evidence of
a negative relationship. Semi-parametric estimates do not indicate any threshold
e ects. Finally, we reconcile our results with four recent, influential papers that found a
substantial negative relationship, especially when public debt exceeds 90 percent of GDP.
These earlier results appear to derive mostly from peculiar parametric specifications of
nonlinearities, or use of small samples which amplify the influence of outliers.
JEL classification: E00, E6, H6, C82.
Keywords: public debt, growth.
úDepartment of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst
†And School of Public Policy
1 Introduction
During the Great Recession and its aftermath, there has been an intense public debate about
the e ect of public debt on economic growth. Advocates of austerity have argued that high
public debt is a drag on economic growth. Others have argued that the causality flows largely
in the other direction: slow economic growth reduces tax revenue and increases the need for
public spending, which together increase fiscal deficits. In the latter view, e orts to reduce
debt by increasing taxes and decreasing spending during a downturn can actually aggravate
macroeconomic problems in economies constrained by insu cient aggregate demand. Critics
also argue that the evidence on how public debt a ects long term growth is at best weak.
Unfortunately, to date, the academic literature on the relationship between debt and
long term growth remains unsettled. There have been a number of important and influential
empirical contributions in this literature, including Reinhart and Rogo  (2010), Cecchetti
et al. (2011), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), and Woo and Kumar (2015). Based
on overlapping samples of developed countries, these four papers make three key arguments.
First, high public debt is associated with lower real GDP growth. Second, the relationship is
interpreted as a causal e ect of debt on growth. Third, there is an important threshold in the
debt-to-GDP ratio (typically identified as 90 percent) above which growth drops substantially.
In contrast, some recent papers have raised questions about the robustness and the causal
content of the debt-growth relationship. Herndon et al. (2014) identifies important problems
in the Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) analysis of the bivariate relationship between public debt
and growth, while Panizza and Presbitero (2014) uses a specific instrumental variable strategy
to argue that the this relationship is not likely causal.1
In this paper we examine the relationship between public debt and GDP in developed
countries broadly, and provide a full assessment of the evidence on the three key arguments.2
1In particular, Panizza and Presbitero (2014) instrument the public debt-to-GDP ratio with the valuation
e ect brought about by the interaction of foreign currency debt and changes in the nominal exchange rate.
2Table 1 describes the papers we review in our study, including the publication outlet and year, whether
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Using a comprehensive database of developed countries used across these studies covering the
period since 1956, we empirically assess whether there is a robust negative relationship between
public debt and growth, whether such a relationship is likely causal, and whether there is any
indication of nonlinearity in this relationship. We first provide evidence on the timing of the
change in growth and debt to assess causality, and find that higher debt is associated more
clearly with past rather than future growth. We then use an ensemble of standard tools to
account for reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity in the relationship between GDP
growth and the public debt-to-GDP ratio: using forward (rather than contemporary) growth
rates; instrumenting current public-debt-to-GDP ratio with its lag; and controlling for lagged
GDP growth rates. We formally establish that these tools do, indeed, mitigate the bias due
to reverse causality under a wide range of assumptions about the data generating processes.
Moreover, we show that the conditions under which each of these strategies reduce bias from
reverse causality are quite di erent. As a result, if the full ensemble of these specifications
suggests a similar estimate, this constitutes a finding that is highly robust to the specific
nature of the bi-directional causality.
We find that the contemporaneous bivariate estimate for the 1956-2003 sample is -
0.021, suggesting that a 100 percentage point increase in public debt is associated with
a 2.1 percentage point reduction in real per capita GDP growth. However, moving from
contemporary to future growth as the outcome diminishes the estimate by one third, yielding
a bivariate coe cient of -0.014. OLS and IV specifications that control for past growth reduce
the original estimate and produce statistically significant estimates of around -0.006. In
contrast, fixed e ects specifications (OLS or IV) suggest somewhat more negative estimates of
around -0.015. When the sample is limited to years since 1970, however, there is no evidence
of a negative association between future growth rate and public debt in any specification.
This is particularly relevant because this is the period studied by three of the papers we
peer-reviewed, and data (country-years).
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examine.
We also provide a transparent assessment of nonlinearities and threshold e ects by
showing the data, and using non-parametric and semi-parametric specifications that make
minimal assumptions about functional forms. These plots provide visual confirmation that
the relationship between public debt and growth is essentially flat for public debt/GDP
exceeding 30 percent when we (1) use forward growth rates, (2) control for past GDP growth,
or both. Contemporary public debt is negatively associated with growth in the preceding five
years, but there is little evidence of a negative association with the 5-year forward growth
rate. We conclude that causality is, thus, more likely to run from GDP growth to public debt
than vice versa. There is no sign of systematic thresholds at elevated levels of public debt in
the data; 5-year forward growth rates are no lower when public debt crosses 90 percent of
GDP.
In addition to providing these preferred estimates based on a superset of the data with a
flexible modeling strategy, we examine each of the papers in detail to provide a reconciliation
of the results across the papers and with our findings. We find substantial sensitivity of some
of the results to choices of model and sample. In particular, we find that use of parametric
models of “turning points” (such as a quadratic specification) can sometimes produce highly
misleading inference. Some of the studies use a relatively small number or countries, where
sometimes a single influential country (e.g., Ireland) is shown to produce a likely spurious
suggestion of an inverse-U shaped relationship between public debt and growth. In other cases,
we find that a negative relationship requires peculiar choices of controls and specifications
that largely disappear when instituting any number of small changes. In contrast, we use a
relatively large set of countries, a set of straightforward and standard regression specifications,
and transparent visual tools to assess the relationships. This allows us to produce robust
inference unlikely driven by peculiar choices sometimes made in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the identification problem,
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justifies the specifications we employ, and discusses our data and sample. Section 3 presents
our main results including from the linear specifications, non- and semi-parametric models,
and replication and re-assessment using specific samples used in the key papers in the
literature. Section 4 summarizes the key findings and concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Endogeneity of debt and the identification problem
From a policy perspective, we are interested in estimating the causal e ect of higher public
debt on growth. The fundamental challenge in identifying this e ect is that debt is endogenous,
and may be a ected by growth. The causal negative relationship from public debt to growth
depends on various crowding-out mechanisms. Public borrowing may raise interest rates,
which can crowd out private investment or, via exchange rate appreciation, reduce net exports.
Some studies also identify inflation associated with government debt as a possible drag on
growth, although neither mechanism, from public debt to inflation nor from inflation to
growth, is typically elaborated. High public debt also creates potential vulnerability to higher
interest rates when public debt is rolled over.
A causal relationship in the other direction, that is, from growth to public debt, is straight-
forward. Slower economic growth reduces tax collections and increases the need for public
spending, e.g., on unemployment insurance. Reduced public revenue and increased public
spending constitute an increase in fiscal deficits through the operation of such “automatic
stabilizers”.
We formalize the reverse causality problem with the following two equations. The first is
growth, which depends on public debt,
git = Ditb1 + uit (1)
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in which git represents the growth rate of GDP for country i in year t, Dit represents the
stock of public debt, b1 is a parameter, and uit represents the error term and includes all
other controls or contributors to GDP growth. The second equation describes the evolution
of public debt,
Dit = gita1 + vit (2)
which introduces the additional parameter a1 and error term vit.
In this classic reverse causality situation, the estimate of b1 is likely biased. The asymptotic
bias of the OLS estimator is given by
plim bˆ1 ≠ b1 = a1(1≠ a1b1)
a21 + ⁄
(3)
where ⁄ = ‡2v‡2u is the ratio of the variance of the error terms.
Analyzing the likely size and direction of bias, we note that if b1 is reasonably small and
a1 < 0, then the bias is negative, i.e., public debt is estimated to be worse for GDP growth
than it actually is.3
Because of concerns about reverse causality, we re-examine the relationship between public
debt and growth with the datasets used in the four sources summarized in Table 1.
The most straightforward approach is to consider the sequencing of public debt and
growth: which comes first? Of the papers we re-examine, only Reinhart and Rogo  (2010)
focuses exclusively on the contemporaneous relationship between public debt and growth,
and we contribute a re-analysis with the forward relationship. The other papers, Cecchetti
3There is also a mechanical negative relationship between growth and public debt/GDP in that lower
GDP growth is mechanically associated with a lower denominator in public debt/GDP; so lower growth and
higher public debt/GDP can be associated through the common term, without any actual economic impact of
public debt on growth.For example, if GDP is measured with error, then a spurious negative relationship will
obtain between growth, log(GDPt)≠ log(GDPt≠1), and the public debt-to-GDP ratio, Public Debtt/GDPt .
Measurement error in GDPt will induce a spuriously negative regression coe cient. A positive error in the
measurement of current GDPt both increases measured growth and decreases the measured ratio of public
debt to GDP. Thus, measurement error will bias the correlation in a negative direction.
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et al. (2011), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), and Woo and Kumar (2015), examine
the relationship between contemporary public debt and forward GDP growth. However, a
correlation between contemporaneous public debt and future GDP growth may not indicate
causality. Hence we introduce additional controls for heterogeneity using lagged growth, and
instrumental variables to assess the causal content of the relationship.
We employ three strategies to address the endogeneity between public debt and GDP
growth: (1) testing the importance of sequencing by examining leads and lags of GDP growth
in relation to public debt; (2) instrumenting contemporary public debt with lagged public
debt to break the confounding causal relationship running from growth to public debt; and
(3) controlling for lagged GDP growth as an alternative way of weakening the reverse causal
relationship, i.e., from growth to public debt. In this section, we describe each of these
approaches in more detail. In Appendix A, we formally derive the conditions under which
these approaches mitigate the bias in the bivariate estimate of contemporaneous growth on
public debt.
2.1.1 Forward versus lagged GDP growth
First, we test temporal sequencing to examine the question of reverse causality. What is the
relationship between contemporaneous high public debt and future or past growth, or which
comes first, public debt or economic growth? As indicated above, Reinhart and Rogo  (2010)
examines exclusively the contemporaneous relationship between current public debt and
current one-year GDP growth. However, the other three papers use forward growth as the key
dependent variable. Woo and Kumar (2015), Cecchetti et al. (2011), and Checherita-Westphal
and Rother (2012) examine forward, or lead, relationships between contemporary public debt
and growth in the succeeding five years.
Under what conditions does the use of forward growth addresses the problem of reverse
causality? The key issues in correctly identifying b1, the strength of the forward and reverse
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causality and the autocorrelation of the error terms in each of the equations for GDP growth,
u in Equation 1, and public debt, v in Equation 2.
Let us suppose reverse causality, i.e., a1 < 0, and no forward causality, i.e., b1 = 0.
Autocorrelation in the error term for the growth equation means that a negative shock to
growth will both be persistent in itself, i.e., recessions linger, and the shock is passed into
the public debt process for a long time, which raises public debt. In a contemporaneous
regression, autocorrelation in the growth equation will erroneously lead to the conclusion
that public debt is bad for growth, i.e., ‚b1 < 0. As we show in Appendix A, averaging growth
over several future periods reduces the bias. Autocorrelation in the error term for public
debt means that a positive shock to public debt persist for a long time. Under the same
supposition about the true value of the parameters, b1 will be properly estimated.
We systematically examine alternative leading and lagging windows for the outcome
variable, real GDP growth, as a function of public debt. We focus on the relationship between
public debt and the 5-year past average growth rate, the contemporaneous growth rate, and
the 5-year forward average growth rate. A contemporaneous relationship is ambiguous with
respect to causality. A leading relationship indicates that causality may run from public debt
to growth. A lagging relationship likely indicates reverse causality, from growth to public
debt.
2.1.2 Controlling for heterogeneity and endogeneity
In addition to examining the relationship between public debt and forward growth as well as
contemporary and lagged growth, we also employ regression specifications that address the
endogeneity in the relationship between public debt and economic growth, and control for
other sources of heterogeneity.
In the baseline case, for comparability with the existing literature, we focus on a linear
relationship between public debt (as a percent of GDP) and GDP growth. Even when the
7
true relationship is nonlinear, the linear coe cient provides us with a weighted average of the
slope of the conditional expectation function. We report the implied change in real average
annual growth per 100 percentage points of public debt/GDP.
After we initially examine the bivariate relationship, we include year dummies throughout
to account flexibly for secular trends in public debt and growth across the advanced economies.
g¯i,t+1,t+k = — · di,t + “t + Ái,t, (4)
where g¯i,t+1,t+k is average growth rate of GDP over the succeeding k years. We also
employ specifications which control for lagged growth:
g¯i,t+1,t+k = — · di,t + fl · gi,t≠1 + “t + Ái,t (5)
Controlling for lagged growth in a growth equation holds constant recent trends in GDP
growth which may be responsible both for the stock of public debt and for continuing economic
performance, for example, if there is substantial serial correlation in the data because of inertia
in the economy. The control for lagged growth thus accounts directly for past downturns,
which may be simultaneously responsible for high debt (because of the accumulation of fiscal
deficits) and continued low growth. As an alternative to using lagged growth, we also estimate
models with country fixed e ects—though this only accounts for time-invariant sources of
heterogeneity across countries:
g¯i,t+1,t+k = — · di,t + µi + “t + Ái,t (6)
As an additional approach to account for the endogeneity of public debt, we instrument
current public debt with 5 year lagged public debt . The IV specification limits identification
to public debt in places where public debt is persistent, i.e., where current public debt is
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explained by a history of public indebtedness rather than by macroeconomic shocks.
1st stage: di,t = – · di,t≠5 + µ1i + “1t + Á1i,t
2nd stage: g¯i,t+1,t+k = — · di,t + µ2i + “2t + Á2i,t
(7)
We also estimate analogous IV regressions with lagged growth control instead of country
fixed e ects.
To summarize our approach to endogeneity in the growth and debt process, we employ
three main methods to address endogeneity: using average forward growth as the dependent
variable; controlling for lagged growth; and using lagged debt as an excluded exogenous
instrument for current debt. Appendix A establishes specific conditions for the time-series
properties of the endogenous growth and debt process that illustrate when each of the
approaches works best and how to interpret concurrent or divergent results with the three
approaches.
The Lagged Growth Control and Average Forward Growth approaches focus identification
on di erent parts of the data-generating process. Controlling for lagged growth focuses
identification of the e ect of debt on innovations in growth, i.e., persistent growth is controlled
for via the inclusion of the lag. Average Forward Growth focuses identification on the persistent
portion of growth, i.e., the accumulation of growth over a five-year period. These alternative
foci imply di erent responses of the estimator to alternative values of (flu(k), flv(k)), where
flu(k) and flv(k) denote the k-th order autocorrelation coe cient for u and v, respectively. In
Appendix A, we illustrate these arguments for the case when the error terms in the growth
and debt equations follow stable AR(1) processes, with AR coe cients „u and „vrespectively.
The Lagged Growth Control and Average Forward Growth estimators have the convenient
property that they reduce bias (or are biased towards zero) under opposite assumptions about
„u. Average Forward Growth, focused on the persistent component, performs better when„u
is relatively low and will be biased toward zero only if „u is relatively high. The Lagged
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Growth Control, focused on innovations, performs better when „u is relatively high and will
be biased toward zero only if „u is relatively low.
This combination means that it cannot be that both of them are biased towards zero
(under the data-generating process). If, for example, both reduce the magnitude of the
estimate vis-à-vis the baseline OLS estimate, then the reduced magnitude constitutes an
improvement on the baseline estimate, and is not a result of specific conditions on („u,„v)
that bias the estimate toward zero. The similarity of the estimates for the Lagged Growth
Control and the Average Forward Growth specification in the empirical analysis imply that
the likely values of („u,„v) are in the intersection of the zones where each strategy reduces
bias.
2.2 Non-Linearities and Thresholds
2.2.1 Parametric approaches in existing work
All four key papers in the literature that we examine emphasize the importance of nonlinear
e ects, and an existence of a threshold above which the relationship between public debt and
growth becomes more negative. Here we briefly summarize their approaches and what we see
as serious shortcomings in each them. A common problem is that none of the papers “show
the data” in a transparent fashion that would help us assess the presence and nature of the
nonlinearity.
Reinhart and Rogo  (2010), which examines real GDP growth stratified by discrete
categories for ranges of the public debt-to-GDP ratio, write, “it is evident that there is no
obvious link between debt and growth until public debt reaches a threshold of 90 percent.
The observations with debt to GDP over 90 percent have median growth roughly 1 percent
lower than the lower debt burden groups and mean levels of growth almost 4 percent lower”
(p. 575). As shown in Herndon et al. (2014), the apparent nonlinearity was not a robust
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finding and was driven by a number of peculiar choices and errors.
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Cecchetti et al. (2011), and Woo and Kumar
(2015) all use parametric methods to identify nonlinearities in the relationship between public
debt and GDP growth.Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) uses a quadratic specification
and reports the turning point: “The debt-to-GDP turning point of this concave relationship
(inverted U-shape) is roughly between 90 and 100% on average for the sample, across all
models. This means that, on average for the 12 euro area countries, government debt-to-GDP
ratios above this threshold would have a negative e ect on economic growth” (p. 1398).
Whether the quadratic specification is actually appropriate is not obvious. For example, one
implication of their quadratic specification is that the relationship between debt and growth
is symmetric around the turning point. If debt really has a negative causal e ect above the
threshold, a quadratic specification imposes a symmetric positive e ect below it.
Woo and Kumar (2015) implements a three-segment linear spline with the segments
comprising public debt-to-GDP ratios of 0–30 percent (“low”), 30–60 percent (“medium”),
and 60–90 percent (“high”). The breakpoints coincide with those identified by Reinhart and
Rogo  (2010) as marking high and low levels of public debt/GDP. Woo and Kumar (2015)
finds that the negative relationship between public debt and GDP growth increases at higher
levels of public debt.4
There is a peculiar aspect of of the Woo and Kumar (2015) specification. While it permits
the slopes of the linear segments to vary, the segments are constrained to point to a single
intercept on the vertical axis, i.e., at a public debt-to-GDP ratio of zero. The coe cients on
the slope of the segments constrained to a single common intercept but without the constraint
4Woo and Kumar (2015) write, “The coe cients of low initial debt (i.e., initial debtúDum_30) are
insignificant and even change sign [with some estimation methods]. In the OLS, the coe cient of medium
level of debt (initial debtúDum_30–90) is significant at 5 percent, and its estimated coe cient is ≠0.025.
But they are all insignificant [using the other estimation methods]. By contrast, the coe cients of high debt
(initial debtúDum_90) are negative and significant under [all estimation estimation methods except country
fixed e ects].” We note, however, that these results are based on a pooled sample of advanced and developing
economics; they do not separately report results from the spline specification for the advanced economies.
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of continuity are not readily interpreted. A schematic of the spline specification issue, which
also a ects the Cecchetti et al. (2011) threshold analysis, is illustrated in the Appendix in
Figure C.1.5
Cecchetti et al. (2011) uses a semi-parametric break-point method for identifying the
threshold. The study implements a two-segment linear spline with an unknown threshold,
with the best-fit threshold identified on the basis of minimizing the sum of squared residuals.6
Cecchetti et al. (2011) implement the threshold in their Equation (2):
g¯i,t+1,t+k = ≠„yi,t + —Xi,t + ⁄≠ · di,tI(di,t < ·) + ⁄+ · di,tI(di,t Ø ·) + µi + “t + Ái,t,t+k,
where I(.) is the indicator function, · is a threshold, g¯i,t+1,t+k is average growth rate of GDP
over the succeeding k years, y is level of GDP, d is public debt/GDP, X represents a set of
controls, and ⁄≠/+ is the responsiveness of GDP growth to public debt/GDP below/above
the threshold.
Thus, as in Woo and Kumar (2015), Cecchetti et al. (2011) neither knots the spline
segments at the threshold nor implements a fully unconstrained spline that permits both an
unconstrained discontinuity and a change in slope at the threshold. The resulting specification
thus does have a discontinuity at the threshold, but the coe cients on the slope of the segments
are constrained because both segments must share a single common y-intercept.
An important shortcoming of all of the formal methods is that, although they identify
turning points from more positive to more negative slopes, they do not distinguish among
5Standard alternatives include a knotted spline that forces continuity (but not di erentiability) by knotting
the linear segments at the breakpoints or an unconstrained spline that permits both discontinuous jumps at
the breakpoints, i.e., threshold e ects, and di erent slopes in the segments. In econometric terms, Woo and
Kumar (2015) includes only the interacted terms but not the main e ects of the indicators for the public
debt/GDP segments.
6 Cecchetti et al. (2011) reports that “96 percent of GDP is the point estimate of the threshold level. At
the 1 percent confidence level, the threshold level lies between 92 percent and 99 percent of GDP — that is,
the level at which we estimate that public debt starts to be harmful to growth may be as low as 92 percent of
GDP and as high as 99 percent (using 5 percent or 10 percent confidence levels would not change the interval
much)” (p. 167).
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a wide variety of concave shapes, from cli s to inverted-v’s or u’s, all of which exemplify
decreasing slope with a turning point or threshold. Even if we both ignore the question
of causality and suppose the turning points to be correctly identified, alternative patterns
around a threshold would have quite di erent implications for interpretation and policy. That
is, the threshold findings in Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Checherita-Westphal and Rother
(2012) are consistent with an inconsequential relationship between public debt and growth in
the policy-relevant region, even if the relationship were causal.
2.2.2 Our approach using non-parametric and semi-parametric methods
In contrast to these parametric approaches, in this paper we employ a number of transparent
methods to assess and quantify nonlinear e ects.
First, we use a bivariate lowess-smoothed regression to summarize the relationship between
contemporary public debt and lagged, contemporary, and future GDP growth at alternative
levels of public debt and to show the actual pattern of the data without assuming functional
forms or thresholds. As in the case of linear regression, an association of higher contemporary
public debt with lower past growth implies reverse causality (from growth to public debt),
the contemporary association is ambiguous, and an association of higher contemporary
public debt with lower future growth would imply causality from public debt to growth.
The nonparametric analysis with alternative lagged and forward growth permits a flexible
examination of non-linearities.
In addition to showing non-parametric estimates, we also examine the full scatterplot of
real GDP growth versus public debt/GDP. Examining the full scatterplot gives a sense of
both the relationship between public debt and growth and, importantly, the wide spread of
GDP growth experience at every level of public debt.
We use the partial linear model (PLM, (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001)) to implement our
preferred regression specification that linearly controls for past GDP growth and time e ects,
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but permits a fully flexible relationship between public debt and future GDP growth.7
g¯i,t+1,t+k = f(di,t) + fl · gi,t≠1 + “t + Ái,t
We also estimate analogous PLM regressions controlling for country fixed e ects instead
of lagged growth.
A particularly useful feature of the partial linear model is that even with fixed e ects
it preserves the levels of the variable on the x-axis. The standard fixed-e ects model is
equivalent to mean di erencing the data, which changes from levels on both the vertical and
horizontal axes to deviations from the unit’s mean x and y values. The partial linear model
applies a di erent approach: ordering the data by x, the independent variable of interest
in the non-parametric relationship; first-di erencing the remaining data, both dependent
and independent variables, along this ordering; estimating the linear portion of the model,
including fixed e ects, with the di erenced data; and then non-parametrically plotting the
y-residuals from the di erenced linear model against the original x-values. Among the
attractions of this method is that it associates (residual) growth with actual level of public
debt. So slopes and turning points are preserved at the actual associated level of public debt.8
2.3 Data on Debt and Growth
In this paper, we use data from International Monetary Fund to construct a dataset of
22 developed countries that largely subsumes the samples used in the key papers in the
literature.9 This dataset includes all of the countries used in the four key papers for which
7We implement the PLM with plreg in STATA.
8Countries may di er in the historical levels of public debt and growth and in the country-specific
relationship between public debt and growth. We do not assess such heterogeneity in the non-linear e ect
in this paper, instead estimating the average relationship between debt and growth across countries. See
Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a discussion of this issue, which is a potential direction for future research.
9We draw these data from Heston et al. (2011) and from the data supplement to Mauro et al. (2013).The
Mauro et al. (2013) closely resemble the Abbas et al. (2010), both of which are provided by the IMF. We use
the Mauro data based on fewer missing observations for the years and countries in the analysis.
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data were available:Reinhart and Rogo  (2010), Cecchetti et al. (2011), Checherita-Westphal
and Rother (2012), Woo and Kumar (2015). We refer to these datasets as RR1955, CMZ,
CWR and WK, respectively. This set of countries relatively closely resembles the 20 developed
countries in Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) with the addition of Iceland and Switzerland, which
appear only in Woo and Kumar (2015). We cannot find complete early data for Luxembourg,
which appears only in Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012). The set of 22 countries
nonetheless has substantially more countries than the 12 that appear in Checherita-Westphal
and Rother (2012) and the 18 that appear in Woo and Kumar (2015) and Cecchetti et al.
(2011). We refer to this dataset as the full sample (FS), which covers the 1956–2003 period.
In addition, we also replicate our findings using the original subset of countries used in each
of the four papers. For the most part, we accept the data definitions and values as presented
by the authors. The details of each dataset are given in Table 2, and we discuss them in
greater detail in our data appendix. We attempted to re-create each of these datasets based
on authors’ description in the paper. In no case were the data archived for replication by the
journals or authors.10
Our specifications, as we discuss in detail below, depend on leads and lags which limit
the availability of data at the endpoints of the series. Regression analysis, lowess plots, and
partial linear models use for each data set a sub-sample that excludes the first 5 years, which
di ers by dataset, and ends in 2003. For RR1955 we limit the sample to 1955 to 2003. We
note that our sample for RR1955 thus excludes from the analysis the immediate-postwar
observations that were at the center of the Herndon et al. (2014) critique of Reinhart and
Rogo  (2010). For CMZ we keep observations from 1985 to 2003. For CWR and WK we
keep observations from 1975 to 2003.
As a robustness check, we additionally estimate the models using a larger set of 32
10Requests for replication data to the corresponding authors for Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012),
Woo and Kumar (2015) did not receive a response. Access to the data for Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) is
discussed in Herndon et al. (2014).
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countries which includes the Eastern European countries that underwent transition to market
economies after 1989. The case for inclusion of these countries is mixed, both because of the
paucity of years available and because the relationship between gross and net public debt
and between public debt and growth may be quite di erent for these countries. Nonetheless,
in the interest of completeness we present the full set of findings for this superset as well.11
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive trends for GDP growth and public debt in ad-
vanced economies
Figure 1 shows the count of countries (out of 22) for which the public debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeded 60 percent or 90 percent over the period 1955–2010. From the middle 1950s through
the late 1960s, the prevalence of high public debt was decreasing, in part because several
countries completed a process of reduction of high public debt from World War II levels. By
the middle 1970s, no country in our full sample had public debt above 60 percent of GDP.
Beginning in the late 1970s we see an increase in the prevalence of higher public debt. By the
middle 1990s, thirteen of the 22 countries in the full sample had public debt above 60 percent
and the number of countries with public debt above 90 percent of GDP hovered around 5.
The prevalence of public debt in excess of either 60 percent or 90 percent of GDP increased
sharply after the Great Recession began in 2007–2008.
Figure 2 shows the interquartile range of real per capita GDP growth across the 22
countries in the sample over the period 1955–2010. The end of the golden age around 1970 is
11As we noted above, the papers under examination all concern the postwar growth experience of the
advanced economies. But there is variation in the years and countries available by data source. We also
examined how di erences in sample years and sample countries, as opposed to di erences in method, a ect
the results by constructing common samples between pairs of datasets and computing the main results for
the common samples. These results, available from the authors, strengthen our substantive conclusions about
the relationship between public debt and growth.
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evident in the data. The laggards of the 1960s had growth similar to the fastest growers in
the 1980s and 1990s.
Growth slowed sharply in the 1970s when public debt was near its nadir. During and after
the 1980s growth remained slow, relative to the postwar boom, and public debt grew. These
figures suggest a negative relationship between growth and public debt. The time series plots
broadly suggest that high growth accompanies debt decreases in the 1960s and that lower
growth preceded the growth of public debt more recently, but it is hard to disentangle the
direction of causality.
3.2 Regression Results using Linear Models
Table 3 shows OLS and IV regression results for the linear relationship between public debt
and current growth and between public debt and future growth using the full sample. These
models specify a linear relationship between public debt/GDP and real per capita GDP
growth. The lower panels of Table 3 reports the same results with the sample limited to 1970
and later. We report the expected change in average annual growth rate associated with a
1 percentage-point increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio.
Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) examines the relationship between public debt and contempo-
raneous GDP growth, which is most closely captured by the Current Growth panel in Table 3.
For example, our coe cient of ≠0.024 in column 1 indicates that a 100 percentage-point
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio would be associated with ≠2.4 percentage point
lower real annual GDP growth. The implied e ect on growth of a 100 percentage-point
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio — for example, the change in Japan from its postwar
boom and very low debt to the 2000s when its public debt exceeded 100 percent of GDP —
implies 2.4 percentage points per year lower real annual GDP growth, a substantial implied
reduction in growth associated with higher public debt. When no other controls are used, the
results using the full sample and contemporaneous public debt and GDP growth data, i.e.,
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the regression specification implied by the Reinhart and Rogo  analysis, find a statistically
significant negative relationship between public debt/GDP and current growth.
The introduction of year dummy variables, with results reported in column 2 of row 1,
substantially reduces the relationship, halving the coe cient from ≠0.024 to ≠0.012, but
preserves statistical significance.
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) reports results for both current growth and 5-year
future growth. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) focuses on nonlinear results modeled
with a quadratic in public debt/GDP but also reports the results for the linear specification
(Models 1(a), 3(a), and 5(a) in Table 2 of CWR). They find that the linear relationship is
statistically insignificant — although it is often positive and sometimes large — for both the
current and future growth specifications. Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Woo and Kumar (2015)
do not report results for the contemporaneous relationship between public debt and growth.
Of greater interest with respect to a causal relationship between public debt and growth
are the results for future growth reported in row 2 of Table 3. Table 5 of Cecchetti et al.
(2011) reports a statistically significant negative e ect on 5-year future growth of ≠0.0164
(p-val = 0.025) per percentage point of public debt/GDP in the linearly modeled relationship,
similar in magnitude to our linear regression results in the pure bivariate specification in
column 1 of row 2 of Table 3. However, the Cecchetti et al. (2011) specification additionally
includes control variables often found in cross-country growth models, as well as country
fixed e ects and the lagged level of log GDP.
When we add time dummies to the regression of future growth on public debt, reported
in column 2 of row 2, the estimated coe cient falls by half, to ≠0.008. When we add one lag
of GDP growth as an explanatory variable, the estimated coe cient falls to ≠0.006 and loses
statistical significance.
We then switch from the inclusion of lagged GDP growth as a control to the use of lagged
public debt as an instrument for contemporaneous public debt. Again, the logic is to identify
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the e ect of high debt on growth for chronic and notorious debtors, those countries for which
past public debt is a good predictor of current public debt, in contrast to learning from
countries whose current public debt reflects only temporary economic straits. The first stage
results are reported in Table 6. The coe cient on once-lagged debt, the excluded exogenous
instrument, is of the expected positive sign — and approximately 1 throughout, which raises
the issue of non-stationarity of public debt — indicating that past debt does partially explain
present debt. The F -statistic for the excluded exogenous instrument is always substantially
greater than 10. Overall we conclude that lagged debt is a meaningful predictor for current
debt, and we argue that sequencing makes a reasonable case for the exclusion restriction, i.e.,
that lagged debt is appropriately excluded from a regression of growth on current debt. In
the instrumental variables result, the coe cient on public debt rises in magnitude to ≠0.008
and is at the edge of statistical significance. When both methods of addressing endogeneity
are used, the estimated coe cient falls to ≠0.006 and is not statistically significant. The
point estimate implies that 100 percentage points of additional public debt reduce growth by
0.6 percentage point.
Returning to row 1, in which current growth is the dependent variable, and examining the
alternative methods of addressing endogeneity, the results are rather similar in magnitude to
the results with forward growth as the dependent variable. In columns 3, 4, and 5 of row
1, the estimated coe cient ranges from ≠0.006 to ≠0.010 and is statistically significant in
all cases. The result gives some confidence in the methods of using lagged GDP growth as
a control and lagged public debt as an instrument in that the current growth specification,
which is more clearly contaminated by endogeneity, yields essentially the same results as the
forward growth specification.
Overall we take row 2, column 5 of Table 3 as our preferred linear specification because it
examines forward growth, accounts for inertial business conditions by controlling for lagged
growth, and uses the instrument of lagged public debt to identify with “chosen” public debt
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rather than endogenous public debt. In this specification the coe cient on public debt/GDP
is ≠0.006 and is significant in the contemporaneous but not forward relationship. Relative to
the bivariate contemporaneous estimate of ≠0.024, the coe cient is one-fourth as large and
not statistically significant.
The final two columns (columns 6 and 7) of Table 3 use country fixed e ects, with
public debt instrumented by its lag in column 6. We do not include the lag of growth in
the fixed-e ect models because of the requirement of strict exogeneity in the estimation of
fixed-e ect panel models (Wooldridge, 2010), which would be violated by correlation between
the country fixed e ect and the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory
variable. The results diverge substantially between datasets and between outcomes of current
and future growth. In the Full Sample analysis reported in Table 3, the addition of country
fixed e ects generally increases the magnitude of the coe cient on public debt, raising it to
roughly ≠0.015 in both forward growth specifications.
In columns 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of row 4, which use forward growth as the dependent variable,
the coe cient on public debt is e ectively zero and never statistically significant, including
in the specifications with endogeneity controls and with fixed e ects. The implication of row
4 is that the e ect of public debt on GDP growth in the post-1970 period is zero.
3.3 Results from Alternative Subsamples
Tables 4 and 5 test the sensitivity of the main results to the sample.12 Because the RR1955
data most closely resemble the Full Sample data, the regression results are in general similar.
In the current growth results in Table 4, the RR1955 results range from ≠0.008 in the
specification with both lagged GDP growth as a control and lagged public debt as an
instrument to ≠0.024 in the specification with fixed e ects and no other controls. With
12The Full Samples results in Table 4 are not identical to those in rows 1 and 2 of Table 3 because the
sample period in Table 4 ends in 2001 to permit the use of identical sampling periods across the datasets.
But the results are similar, even if not identical.
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forward growth as the dependent variable, reported in row 2 of Table 5, the coe cients remain
negative although generally smaller in magnitude than in the current-growth specifications
and statistical significance drops away in the three specifications that address endogeneity
without fixed e ects (columns 3–5 of Table 5). With the RR1955 data, the coe cient on
public debt/GDP in the country fixed-e ect specification is negative and significant. In the
future growth specification with country fixed e ects, reported in columns 6 and 7 of Table 5,
100 percentage points of public debt/GDP correspond to a reduction in growth of ≠1.8 to
≠1.9 percentage points in the RR1955 data. These are the upper-bound estimates in the
future growth regressions, which are reported in Table 5.
The results for the other three datasets are quite di erent. With one exception, the
coe cients in all specifications for the other three datasets, CMZ, CWR, and WK, range
from essentially zero to, in several cases, positive and significant. The CMZ data shows
a significant positive relationship between public debt and both contemporary and future
growth. This is especially surprising because the result for the linear model reported in
Cecchetti et al. (2011) included fixed e ects and was significantly negative; we return to
these results in more detail below. With the CWR data including country fixed e ects, the
estimated coe cient on public debt is negative with contemporary growth (columns 6 and 7
Table 4) but zero with future growth (columns 6 and 7 of Table 5).
3.3.1 Alternative Sample Results
Here we examine the sensitivity of the results to inclusion of alternative countries and years.
In particular, we find that the relationship between public debt and growth weakened after
the 1960s. This is important both because these more recent estimates are of greater relevance
for policy today, and because most of the literature has focused on this period.
In rows 3 and 4 of Table 3 we limit the sample to post-1970 data in order to test whether
the e ect of public debt on GDP growth has remained stable over time. The results are quite
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striking. In columns 3, 4, and 5 of row 3, which all use current growth as the dependent
variable with the three specifications proposed to address endogeneity, the coe cient on
public debt ranges from ≠0.001 to ≠0.003. All three are precisely estimated. When country
fixed e ects are included in columns 6 and 7 of row 3, the estimated coe cient on public
debt increases somewhat in magnitude from the estimates without fixed e ects. In column
6 with fixed e ects but no endogeneity controls, the magnitude is similar in size to the
estimate on the post-1955 data. When lagged public debt is introduced as an instrument for
contemporaneous public debt, the magnitude of the estimated coe cient falls by about half,
to ≠0.007. The results for the Reinhart and Rogo  data prove particularly sensitive to the
inclusion of the earlier years. We discuss this in more detail below.
In Table 7, we first expand the sample to include the full set of 32 high-income OECD
countries, which adds most of the post-socialist European transition economies as well as
Chile, Israel, and South Korea. These results are reported in the panels entitled HI56
and HI70. Then we limit this expanded sample by dropping the 6 post-socialist European
transition economies, reported in the panels entitled HIxEE55 and HIxEE70.
In our preferred specifications, columns 3–5, there is modestly higher sensitivity of growth
to public debt (but not at statistically distinguishable levels) in the post-1955 data when the
additional countries are added. In the post-1970 data with the expanded set of countries, the
coe cients are somewhat larger than for the post-1970 data from the original set of countries
(see Panel FS1970: Future Growth in Table 3), precision decreases sharply, and there is never
statistical significance in the estimated relationship between public debt and growth. The
fixed-e ect results for the post-1970 data for both expanded country samples show a positive
but statistically insignificant relationship between public debt and growth.
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3.4 Alternative Leads and Lags
Figure 3 probes the sensitivity of the regression specifications to alternative lags and leads in
the definition of the dependent variable and the inclusion of alternative lags of the dependent
variable as control variables. The vertical axis reports coe cient on public debt in linear
regression models which vary with alternative leads or lags in the definition of the dependent
variable and with controls for alternative lags of dependent variable. Along the horizontal
axis, we examine 11 alternative definitions of the window for the outcome variable, from
5 years lagged growth through current growth to 5 years forward growth.
For the cases with contemporaneous or forward growth as the dependent variable, we also
examine 3 alternative controls for lagged growth: no control for lagged growth (indicated
by green circles); 1-year lagged growth (orange triangles); and 5-year lagged growth (blue
diamonds). All models include year dummies. Throughout, we use filled shapes to indicate
statistical significance at the 5-percent level.
Figure 3 presents results for the full sample in the upper panel and for RR1955 in the
lower panel. The solid green circle in the middle of the upper panel shows the coe cient of
≠0.016 in the regression of contemporaneous growth on contemporaneous public debt/GDP,
which corresponds to row 1, column 2 of Table 4.
The introduction of 1-year lagged growth as a control variable in the contemporaneous
regressions reduces the coe cient to a smaller though still-significant value of approximately
≠0.010 indicated by the filled orange triangle. A control for 5-year lagged growth in the
contemporaneous growth equation yields a statistically insignificant coe cient around ≠0.01
(unfilled square and unfilled diamond) for the relationship between contemporaneous public
debt and current growth.
When we examine growing windows of forward growth — without yet controlling for
lagged growth — the coe cient on public debt/GDP declines in magnitude from ≠0.016 to
roughly ≠0.012 as the number of leads increases The solid green circle at the right edge of
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the upper panel shows the coe cient ≠0.012 in the regression of five-year forward growth on
contemporaneous public debt/GDP, which corresponds to row 1, column 2 of Table 5.
With controls for lagged growth, the negative association between public debt and future
growth is uniformly somewhat smaller and is statistically significant only in the case of
1-year forward growth with 1-year lagged growth as a control. With eight-year lagged
growth as a control, the coe cient on public debt (blue diamonds) decreases from ≠0.008 in
the contemporaneous model to ≠0.003 for leads two through five and is never statistically
significant.
When we examine growing windows of lagged growth as the dependent variable, the
coe cients become substantially more negative, around ≠0.02, which indicates a strong
negative association between past growth and contemporary public debt. That is, public
debt is more strongly associated with past low growth than with contemporary or future low
growth.
In the lower panel, which uses RR1955 and the same specifications as in the upper panel,
the only statistically significant negative relationship between public debt and growth is for
the contemporaneous relationship with no controls for lagged growth. Even in this case the
statistical significance is weak. The second row of Table 5 shows that public debt is significant
only at the 10 percent level. With no control for past growth, the relationship between public
debt and future growth at any lead is small and insignificant, falling by about half with a
one-year lead and shrinking to essentially zero by five years out.
Any control for lagged growth with every forward lead for growth as the dependent variable
yields a statistically insignificant estimated relationship. With both contemporaneous growth
and every lead of growth, once a control for the eight-year lag of growth is introduced,
the point estimates ranges between ≠0.005 with contemporaneous growth to ≠0.002 with
any lead and are statistically insignificant throughout. With every lead of growth as the
dependent variable and any control for lagged growth, the estimates are always below ≠0.01
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and statistically insignificant for any control for lagged growth and any forwarding more than
one year.
The lower panel of Figure 3, RR1955, shows a pattern nearly identical to that of the
upper panel with a negative statistically significant coe cient for contemporaneous growth
regressed on contemporaneous public debt/GDP and for forward growth of one or two years
if no controls are added. But no other statistically significant coe cients for the relationship
of growth and public debt appear when four-year or eight-year lagged growth is included as a
control or when forward growth of more than two years is used as the dependent variable.
The remaining three panels of Figure 3 performs the same analysis of alternative forward
windows for the Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Cecchetti et al. (2011), and Woo and
Kumar (2015) samples. With neither contemporaneous data nor with any forward window
is there a statistically significant relationship between GDP growth and public debt/GDP.
The estimate for the e ect of public debt/GDP on growth is close to zero throughout (and
sometimes positive). All of the estimates are close to zero in the bivariate relationship and
with controls for one-year, four-year, or eight-year lagged GDP growth.
3.5 Summary of Linear Regression Results
It is useful to summarize the findings from the linear analysis of the hypothesized negative
relationship between public debt and growth. In the contemporaneous relationship, the full
sample and RR1955 generally yields negative estimated relationships between public debt
and growth. The relationship declines when forward growth rather than current growth
is used as the dependent variable and when a control for lagged growth is introduced. As
the figure showing the relationship between alternatives windows and coe cient estimates
demonstrates, the relationship is stronger for past growth and contemporaneous debt than
for future growth and contemporaneous debt. The longer forward relationship is weak.
The introduction of lagged public debt as an instrument for contemporaneous public debt
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generally reduces the magnitude of the estimated relationship between public debt and GDP
growth. For the RR1955 data with current growth as the outcome variable, Table 4 Column
2 shows instrumental variable results some 25 to 50 percent smaller than the simple bivariate
results. The coe cient on public debt in the instrumented specification with lagged growth is
zero with the CWR data and is actually positive (although not statistically significant) with
CMZ data. When both lagged GDP growth is included as a control and contemporaneous
public debt is instrumented with past public debt, the magnitude of the coe cient falls still
further in the RR1955 data and remains very close to zero in the CMZ and CWR data.
The pattern is similar in Table 5 which reports the IV regression results using the forward
lead dependent variable in Columns 4 and 5. The coe cients with CWR and CMZ data is
e ectively zero (positive but statistically insignificant point estimates). With the Full Sample
and RR1955 data, the estimated coe cient ranges between ≠0.008 and ≠0.012, i.e., between
one-third and one-half the value of the coe cient for the Full Sample and RR1955 data in
Table 4 Column 1.
The introduction of country fixed e ects, reported in the last three columns of Tables 4
and 5, yields highly variable results. With the Full Sample and with the RR1955 data, the
coe cient on public debt/GDP remains negative, with or without the use of lagged debt as
an instrument or the inclusion of time dummies. The implied diminution in forward GDP
growth is around ≠0.018 percentage points of GDP growth per percentage point of public
debt/GDP. The coe cient with the CMZ data is large and positive, with 1 percentage point
of public debt/GDP associated with a statistically significant positive increase in forward
GDP growth of +0.022 to +0.024 percentage points (and +0.006 to +0.024 percentage points
in contemporary GDP growth).
Our basic result for the Full Sample data can be found by tracking rows 1 and 2 in
Table 3. Table 3, row 1, column 1 describes a contemporaneous, bivariate relationship of
≠0.024. As we move to row 2 and examine columns 1–4 the estimated relationship with
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the outcome changed to forward growth and with the addition of explanatory variables to
control for potential reverse causality, the alternative specifications imply a reduction in
the key relationship between public debt and growth by between 50 and 70 percent in the
point estimate of the magnitude and from strong statistical significance to insignificance or
marginal significance.
The RR1955 data, which closely resemble the full sample, yield similar results as shown
in Table 4. For the CMZ, CWR, and WK data, the results in Tables 4 and 5 never include
significant negative estimates for the bivariate relationship in either the contemporaneous
or forward data. We conclude that the negative relationship between public debt and GDP
growth found in Cecchetti et al. (2011), Woo and Kumar (2015), and Checherita-Westphal
and Rother (2012) represents artifacts of specification, sample inclusion, and functional form,
which we explore in more detail below.
3.6 Nonlinearities and Thresholds
3.6.1 Bivariate Relationship between Public debt and Growth
Although linear regression results are a useful summary of the relationship between public
debt and GDP growth, the extant literature has often emphasized non-linearities in the
relationship, and in particular identifies important threshold e ects in the relationship between
public debt-to-GDP ratio and economic growth. For the non-linear analysis, we settled on
five-year forward growth as our preferred outcome indicator based on the stability of the
linear results reported in Figure 3.
We report results for the Full Sample (FS1956), the Full Sample limited to years after
1970 (FS1970), and the other four papers. Figure 4 shows the bivariate lowess estimates of
GDP growth versus public debt/GDP for each dataset. The left panel plots 5-year lagged
GDP growth versus current year public debt/GDP, therefore capturing a likely reverse-causal
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relationship from growth to public debt.The middle panel of each triptych shows current GDP
growth versus current-year public debt-to-GDP ratio. Strikingly, while the contemporaneous
relationship is downward sloping across datasets, the slope is generally less pronounced than
in the left-hand panels. The fact that contemporary pubic debt is more strongly associated
with past growth rather than current growth is indicative of reverse causality.
The right panel shows future growth, expressed as the annualized average real GDP
growth over the succeeding five years versus current-year public debt-to-GDP ratio. Between
public debt-to-GDP of 30 percent and 150 percent, the policy relevant range for current
debates, the lowess plots indicate a small to zero relationship between public debt and future
growth in any of the datasets. In particular, the more recent data in FS1970, CWR, CMZ,
and WK, show no relationship.
Although at medium to high levels of public debt there is essentially no relationship
between public debt and GDP growth, the relationship between GDP growth and public debt
at low levels of public debt varies strongly by dataset. In both the FS and RR1955 analysis,
most of the observed 1.5 percentage point decline in GDP growth between 0 and 100 percent
of public debt/GDP is, contrary to debt-threshold hypotheses, concentrated in the first 30
percentage points of public debt/GDP. In contrast, in CMZ the relationship between public
debt/GDP and GDP growth is sharply positive in the first 30 percentage points of public
debt/GDP (and flat thereafter). CWR also shows a modest negative relationship over the
lower range (the left tail of the rotated S).
We show the actual data in scatterplots in Figure 8. Using future growth as the outcome
variable, the Full Sample data, the RR1955 data, the CMZ data, and the CWR data all
show one or more especially fast-growing countries in the medium-high public debt range.
In the Full Sample, RR1955, and CWR data, the case is Ireland in the early 1990s, while
in the CMZ data, the medium-high-debt, high-growth case is Portugal in the middle 1980s.
These potentially anomalous country-years may be particularly important for identification
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of turning points in Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) and Cecchetti et al. (2011).
3.6.2 Semi-Parametric Analysis using a Partial Linear Model
While the bivariate relationships are illustrative, they do not control for the same variables
as do the linear regression results. Therefore, we next use a partial linear model to linearly
control for these covariates, while allowing a nonparametric relationship between public debt
and growth. Results for the Full Sample (FS1956) and the Full Sample after 1970 (FS1970)
are shown in Figure 5. These figures show alternative specifications, one with a control for
lagged growth and one with country fixed e ects. Only FS1956 with country fixed e ects
shows any indication of a negative relationship between public debt and growth, a roughly
linear decline of approximately 1 percentage point of GDP growth over 100 percentage points
of public debt-to-GDP ratio. This relationship disappears in the more recent data, FS1970.
Results for all of the datasets are shown in Figures 6 and 7. First, following our linear
regressions, we control for recent growth by including 1-lag of GDP growth in the partial
linear model shown in Figure 6 and then for country fixed e ects in Figure 7.
The lowess curves that control for lagged GDP growth are generally rather flat, indicating
little relationship. One exception is CWR where the relationship appears as a shallow
rotated-S shape. There is a turning point at roughly 90 percent, but the inverted-U shape
at that location is shallow. Accounting for confidence intervals, the estimated function is
indistinguishable from a horizontal line. Overall there is little relationship between public
debt and future GDP growth once lagged GDP growth is taken into account.
The lowess curves with country fixed e ects show substantial variation across datasets.
FS1956 and RR1955 show the strongest negative relationship with roughly 1 percentage
point of growth lost per 100 percentage points of public debt-to-GDP ratio. There is no
indication of a threshold near a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 percent. There is no sign of a
negative relationship in the FS1970 data. In the case of CMZ there is a sharp increase in
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growth as public debt ranges from 16 percent, the lowest value of public debt/GDP in the
CMZ data, to 50 percent of GDP followed by a horizontal (non-)relationship. CWR and WK
show increasing growth up to a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 100 percent and flat relationship
thereafter.
To summarize, the relationship between public debt and forward growth is modest across
a variety of specifications. Taken together the semi-parametric plots including country and
year fixed e ect indicate at most modest reductions in growth which largely disappear in
more recent data. Importantly, we find no evidence across various specifications of any
clear threshold at elevated levels of public debt, and this is true whether we control for
heterogeneity using fixed e ects or lagged outcomes. These findings stand in contrast to
claims in the four key studies we review here. Therefore, in the next sections we scrutinize
the findings of both linear e ects and nonlinearities in these paper in greater detail.
3.6.3 Replication of Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012)
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) report a threshold e ect based on a quadratic
specification to identify a turning point in the relationship between public debt and GDP
growth. The analysis finds the peak of the quadratic to be at a public debt-to-GDP ratio
between 90 and 100 percent. It is important to keep in mind what is meant by the “turning
point of this concave relationship”. Taken at face value, the implication is that public debt has
a growth-enhancing e ect up until the turning point. The results reported in the paper imply
that a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent, the maximum public debt level permitted
under the Maastricht agreement and subsequent European Stability and Growth pact, reduce
growth by roughly one percentage point of annual GDP growth relative to maintaining public
debt/GDP at the peak around public debt/GDP of 90 and 100 percent. Another feature of a
quadratic is that around the peak the slope is necessarily close to zero, which means that
changes in public debt are unlikely to have a large e ect on growth.
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The lowess plot from the CWR data presents a rotated-S shape, with a trough of annual
GDP growth of 2.03 percent at public debt/GDP of 35 percent and a peak of annual GDP
growth of 2.73 percent at public debt/GDP of 90 percent. Although the shape is dramatic
and the estimate at high public debt/GDP is reasonably precise (in terms of the width of the
lowess error bands), the net relationship — both the positive relationship between public
debt/GDP of 35 and 90 percent and the negative relationship between public debt/GDP of
90 and 140 — does not amount to much. With relatively close values of annual GDP growth
at the trough and peak (2.73≠ 2.03 = 0.7 percentage points of GDP growth), there is simply
not much room for a strong relationship between public debt and GDP growth. A horizontal
line at annual real GDP growth 2.5 would miss some of the nonlinearity, but it would be
hard to reject as a characterization of the relationship between public debt and growth in
these data.
Visual inspection of the actual scatterplot of CWR data in the CWR panel of Figure 8
indicates a highly visible and potentially influential set of points that trace out a high arc.
Thus the actual scatterplot underlying the rotated S-shape of the lowess fit to the CWR
data indicates that there are one or two countries with high future growth associated with
moderately high public debt. That is, the curve is being pulled up as public debt/GDP
approaches 90 percent from below. As we noted above, these outlying cases are Portugal in
the middle 1980s and Ireland in the early 1990s.
Focusing on the data points from Ireland, that country’s peak growth occurred in the
mid-1990s when public debt was between 70 and 80 percent of GDP. We estimate partial
linear regressions plots with and without the inclusion of the Ireland in Figure 12. Ireland
proves to be fairly influential in generating the rotated-S shape in the relationship, a result
that obtains with and without fixed e ects. Indeed, without Ireland, the relationship between
public debt and growth is essentially flat in the model that controls for lagged growth and
modestly upward sloping in the model with fixed country e ects.
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Ireland has a particularly important e ect in the CWR results because the CWR data are
limited to twelve countries. The same data for Ireland exert less influence in the Full Sample
and the other large datasets simply because they represent a smaller share of the data points.
This points to the pitfalls of using a small sample, where inference can be driven by a single
influential case.
The results also support the proposition that parametric trend-break tests can be mislead-
ing, and so it is important to examine the data directly as well. The nonparametric curve in
the CWR sample does turn downward at public debt/GDP above 90 — a fact captured by
the maximum of the quadratic in CWR’s regression — but it turns downward from a set of
very high growers among countries with moderate-to-high public debt. It is not that growth
collapses at public debt/GDP of 90 percent but rather that there are a small number of high
growth cases immediately below 90 percent public debt/GDP.
Overall, our re-analysis of the CWR sample suggests that there is little overall relationship
between public debt and growth in their sample. There is an indication of a non-monotonic
relationship between the variables, which suggests a threshold e ect of debt on growth.
However, this inference is driven almost entirely due to a combination of a parametric test
along with a single influential country (Ireland) in a small sample. Either using more data,
or excluding that influential case, suggests there is no such threshold e ect.
3.7 Sensitivity of years in Reinhart and Rogo  (2010)
Sensitivity to years was a central issue in the interpretation of the initial Reinhart and Rogo 
(2010) finding, with Herndon et al. (2014) noting the particular importance of the treatment
of the immediate postwar. In web-published errata to the original paper, Reinhart and Rogo 
(2013) bypassed the question of the immediate postwar by selecting 1955 as the starting
date for the revised analysis and found a modest negative relationship, without non-linearity,
in the contemporaneous relationship between public debt and growth. However, the 1955
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starting point substantially predates the starting dates for the other three papers on public
debt and growth in the postwar advanced economies (see Tables 1 and 2). In our initial
analysis we limited the Reinhart and Rogo  sample to years after 1970 for comparability with
the other three papers under analysis, and we found that the negative relationship between
public debt and GDP growth largely disappears in the post-1970 data. In this section we
assess the sensitivity of the Reinhart and Rogo  results to the specific selection of post-1955
years by comparing the estimated relationship in earlier and later periods.
With the RR1955 data in the linear model, the coe cient on public debt/GDP decline
by about one-third to one-half with the change from contemporaneous to future growth
and cease to be significant at the 5-percent level (see Table 5). However the point estimate
continues to indicate a negative relationship between public debt and future growth in the
RR1955 data, and the estimates from the country fixed-e ect models using RR1955 data
are substantially and significantly negative. Figure 11 explores the source of the negative
relationship by splitting the RR1955 data into years through 1965 and years after 1965 with
a separate lowess curve for each period.
In Figure 11 with future growth as the outcome variable, the 1955–1965 data show a
much more pronounced negative relationship between growth and public debt/GDP than do
the post-1965 data. Indeed, post-1965 there is essentially no relationship between public debt
and future growth. The RR data stratified by pre- and post-1965 suggest that a handful of
countries went from extremely low debt to moderate debt and also had growth slowdowns
during 1955-1965. These cases are likely responsible for the negative point estimates in some
of the RR results.
To demonstrate that this analysis is not sensitive to the choice of year, Table 8 repeats
the linear regression analysis using subsets of the RR1955 data, limited to years after 1960,
1965, and 1970. For every specification, the coe cient declines steadily with the limitation to
more recent years. For both the post-1965 and post-1970 subsamples, no specification yields
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a statistically significant result and the coe cients are generally small in magnitude.
3.8 Replication of Cecchetti et al. (2011)
In the case of Cecchetti et al. (2011), there is a substantial divergence between the large,
precise negative estimate of ≠0.0164 (p-val= 0.025) in the linear specification of the e ect of
Government debt on future GDP growth (“Not controlling for banking crises”) reported in
their Table 5, row 7, column 2 and our linear estimates in Tables 4 and 5 which were ranged
from zero to positive, large, and significant. Indeed in the country fixed-e ect specification
for forward growth in Table 5, which most closely resemble the Cecchetti et al. (2011)
specification reported above, our parameter estimate is +0.022, i.e., positive, and significant
at the 5-percent level (standard error = 0.010). We therefore undertook a more complete
replication of Cecchetti et al. (2011)’s more fully specified model. The results are presented
in Table 9.
By including country fixed e ects and the full set of controls from “standard growth
regressions,” we successfully replicated the Cecchetti et al. (2011) result of ≠0.016 in Table 9,
column 2 of the panel titled “Controls Included, Country FE Included.” But note that all
estimates in the first three panels — every model without both controls and fixed e ects —
are zero or positive. That is, the Cecchetti et al. (2011) result indicating a negative e ect of
public debt on future GDP growth depends precisely on the inclusion of both controls and
fixed e ects.
Furthermore, Cecchetti et al. (2011) (and we in our best attempt at replication) include
among the controls “the log of real per capita GDP at time t (to capture the ‘catch-up
e ect’ or conditional convergence of the economy to its steady state)” (p. 159). However,
convergence in empirical implementations of Solow models, e.g., Mankiw et al. (1992), means
convergence to the income level of the rich countries. In a model with country fixed e ects,
the inclusion of lagged log level of real per capita GDP e ectively models convergence to the
34
country’s own average income, which is substantially di erent from Solow-type convergence.
Thus the inclusion of once-lagged log level of real per capita GDP is not well motivated by
theory. In any case, however, the model should be robust to including more than one lag of
the log level of real per capita GDP, that is, robust to a generalization.
Table 9, column 1 of the panel titled “Controls Included, Country FE Included” shows
the estimate of the coe cient on public debt/GDP for the CMZ model with country fixed
e ects and all controls except the lagged log level of real per capita GDP. The estimate of
the e ect of public debt on GDP growth is +0.018, i.e., positive, and significant at just above
the 5-percent level (standard error = 0.009).
As we argued above, a potentially valuable control in these models is the lagged dependent
variable, i.e., lagged percent change in real GDP, to capture the reverse-causal e ects on
public debt of persistent booms or recessions. In column 3 of the same panel we estimate
the CMZ model substituting lagged percent change for the lagged log level. Estimation with
a control for the lagged change in GDP, i.e., GDPt≠1 ≠GDPt≠2, imposes the restriction of
equal, opposite coe cients on lagged and twice-lagged GDP, i.e., on GDPt≠1 and GDPt≠2.
The point estimate for the e ect of public debt on GDP growth is again positive, 0.016,
although significant only at the 10-percent level (standard error = 0.010). Finally in column 4,
we include GDPt≠1 and GDPt≠2 separately, which nests both the CMZ model (coe cient
on GDPt≠2 restricted to zero) and our lagged dependent variable model (coe cient on
GDPt≠2 restricted to be equal and opposite to the coe cient on GDPt≠2). In column 4, the
nesting model, the e ect of public debt on GDP growth is estimated at zero with substantial
precision.13
A key CMZ result thus appears to be highly fragile with respect to alternative specifications.
Only the particular combination of country fixed e ects, specific control variables, and once-
13All of these specifications, the lagged log level of real per capita GDP and the lagged percent change in
real per capita GDP, potentially violate the strict exogeneity requirement in a fixed-e ect model.
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lagged log level of real per capita GDP yields a negative estimate for the relationship between
public debt and future GDP growth. All reasonable alternative specifications, including
the modest generalization of including first and second lags of log level real per capita
GDP, generate substantively di erent results, and none of these show a negative relationship
between public debt and future GDP growth.
4 Conclusions
Our re-examination of the relationship between public debt and growth in advanced economies
finds little evidence to suggest a substantial, causal negative relationship. First, we demon-
strate that there is strong indication of a reverse causal relationship from GDP growth to
public debt. Indeed, contemporaneous public debt is more strongly correlated with GDP
growth in the preceding five years than the growth in the five years in future, suggesting
that weak GDP growth probably causes higher public debt. Possible mechanisms include
higher deficits, i.e., reduced tax collection and increased public expenditure as well as the
mechanical explanation of slow growth in the denominator of public debt/GDP.
We then use a number of standard tools to account for reverse causality in the bivariate
regression of growth on public debt: comparing the response of forward and lagged growth
rates; instrumenting current public debt/GDP with its lag to learn from chronic debtors;
and controlling for lagged GDP growth rates to pick up the lingering e ects of booms or
recessions. These simple methods of accounting for reverse causality diminish the size of the
association by between 50 and 70 percent, with these specifications yielding in most cases
coe cients indistinguishable from zero. Temporal sequencing of public debt and GDP growth
does not in general support the proposition that higher public debt reduces GDP growth.
Non- and semi-parametric plots provide visual confirmation that the relationship between
public debt/GDP and GDP growth is essentially flat for public debt/GDP exceeding 30
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percent when we (1) use forward growth rates, (2) control for past GDP growth, or both.
There is little evidence of a lower growth rate when public debt exceeds 90 percent of GDP
when using the 5-year forward average growth rate.
These results stand in sharp contrast with four key papers in the literature that we
review, though consistent with the findings in Panizza and Presbitero (2014). First, despite
the remarkably consistent finding of an important growth threshold around 90 percent
with alternative methods employed by Reinhart and Rogo  (2010), Cecchetti et al. (2011),
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), and Woo and Kumar (2015), our non- and semi-
parametric lowess plots (and the full scatterplots) strongly suggest that there is no threshold
at elevated levels of public debt.
In the cases of Cecchetti et al. (2011), Woo and Kumar (2015), and Checherita-Westphal
and Rother (2012), parametric tests for a threshold identified breaks around a public debt-
to-GDP ratio of 90 percent. But these papers insu ciently explored the character of these
breaks. In the case of Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) the lowess plots show that
the threshold slightly above 90 percent public debt/GDP is in fact the peak of a shallow
rotated S, although the curve is so shallow as to have no substantive importance. Moreover,
the role of a highly influential case (Ireland) in a small sample of 12 countries, along with
peculiarities of a quadratic specification, produces a misleading and fragile suggestion of a
threshold in the Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) sample.
In the case of both Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Woo and Kumar (2015) the estimated
spline specification appears not to correspond with the authors’ intent. In Cecchetti et al.
(2011) we find no robustness of the result in the linear specification. The negative relationship
appears only in a very particular specification, which does not have particular prior claims.
Modest variants yield altogether di erent results. Lowess plots using the data for Cecchetti
et al. (2011) indicate that GDP growth is flat or even increasing in public debt/GDP. In the
case of Woo and Kumar (2015), the lowess specification does not indicate any important
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break around 90 percent.
We conclude with three main points. First, employing a range of methods, including
temporal sequencing, linear models, and semi-parametric models, gives some robustness in the
e ort to measure the relationship between public debt and growth. The overall finding is that
the e ect of public debt on GDP growth is small. For the data beginning in 1955, a 100-point
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio causes no more than a ≠0.8 percentage point
decrease in annual real GDP growth, without statistical significance in most specifications.
The e ect of public debt on growth is essentially zero after 1970.
Second, there is an important inconsistency between the conclusions of the papers in the
literature which appear to uniformly suggest a negative causal relationship. If we simply
consider a bivariate relationship between forward growth and public debt, there is essentially
no relationship between these two since 1970, the period considered in much of the recent
relationship. This means that the simple bivariate findings of a negative relationship in
Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) simply do not show up in the time period or samples of Cecchetti
et al. (2011), Woo and Kumar (2015), and Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012). The
conclusions in those paper of a negative relationship require either use of very particular set
of controls, or questionable use of tests of trend breaks which are driven by small samples,
outliers and parametric choices.
Third, many policy decisions to confront public debt via austerity have hinged on the
presumption of a threshold. There is no evidence of a public debt threshold above which
growth is substantially reduced in any of the data, using any method. Our findings underscore
the importance of looking at the data themselves rather than relying on opaque parametric
tests to derive conclusions about how public debt a ects growth.
38
References
Abbas, SM, Nazim Belhocine, Asmaa A ElGanainy, and Mark Horton. 2010. “A historical
public debt database,” IMF Working Papers: 1–26.
Cecchetti, Stephen, Madhusudan Mohanty, and Fabrizio Zampolli. 2011. “Achieving Growth
Amid Fiscal Imbalances: The Real E ects of Debt,” in Economic Symposium Conference
Proceedings. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: 145–196, Also published as BIS Working
Paper No. 352, http://www.bis.org/publ/work352.htm and http://www.bis.org/publ/
othp16.pdf.
Checherita-Westphal, Cristina and Philipp Rother. 2012. “The impact of high government
debt on economic growth and its channels: An empirical investigation for the euro area,”
European Economic Review, 56(7): 1392–1405.
DiNardo, John and Justin L Tobias. 2001. “Nonparametric density and regression estimation,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4): 11–28.
Herndon, Thomas, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin. 2014. “Does high public debt consistently
stifle economic growth? A critique of Reinhart and Rogo ,” Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 38(2): 257–279, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bet075.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2011. Penn World Table Version 7.0,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University
of Pennsylvania.
Kumar, M and J. Woo. 2010. “Public debt and growth,” IMF Working Paper WP10/174.
Mankiw, N Gregory, David Romer, and David N Weil. 1992. “A contribution to the empirics
of economic growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2): 407–437.
Mauro, Paolo, Rafael Romeu, Ariel J Binder, and Asad Zaman. 2013. A modern history of
fiscal prudence and profligacy in , WP(13/5): International Monetary Fund.
Panizza, Ugo and Andrea F. Presbitero. 2013. “Public Debt and Economic Growth in
Advanced Economies: A Survey,” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES),
149(II): 175–204.
Panizza, Ugo and Andrea F Presbitero. 2014. “Public debt and economic growth: Is there a
causal e ect?,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 41: 21–41.
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogo . 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 100: 573–578.
2013. “Errata: Growth in A Time of Debt,” May 5.
39
Woo, Jaejoon and Manmohan S. Kumar. 2015. “Public debt and growth,” Economica, 82:
705–739.
Wooldridge, Je rey M. 2010. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data: MIT
press.
40
Table 1: Papers on public debt and economic growth
Dataset, Publication, and Data Source PeerReviewed Countries Years
RR1955 Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) American
Economic Review Papers & Proceedings and
Reinhart and Rogo  (2013) Errata: Growth in a
Time of Debt . Data: authors.
No 20 1955–2009
CMZ Cecchetti et al. (2011) Economic
Symposium Conference Proceedings, Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City; and BIS Working
Paper No. 352. Data: OECD.
No 18 1980–2009
CWR Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012)
European Economic Review. Data: AMECO.
Yes 12 1970–2008
WK Kumar and Woo (2010) and Woo and
Kumar (2015) IMF Working Paper and
Economica. Data: PWT 7.0, IMF WEO, IMF
Public Finances in Modern History Fiscal
Prudence and Profligacy Database.
Yes 21 1970–2008
Notes. The table reports publication information, listed data sources, and the count of countries and
years for each of the papers. Where applicable, both working paper and published versions are cited.
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Table 2: Countries included, by data source
Full Sample RR1955 CMZ CWR WK
(1956–2003) (1955–2003) (1985–2003) (1975–2003) (1975–2003)
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark 1976–79
Finland
France 1973–77 1970–76
Germany
Greece 1955–69
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands 1955–56 1970–74
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal 1970–72
Spain 1959–79
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA
Notes. The table reports the countries and years used in our analysis. indicates availability of
data for the full set of years listed at the top of the column; otherwise a list of years reports
missing data for the country.
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Table 3: Public Debt and Growth: Regression Results for Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FS1956: Current Growth
Public Debt/GDP -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.007** -0.010 -0.007 -0.025*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 1056 1056 1034 946 946 1056 946
FS1956: Future Growth
Public Debt/GDP -0.014*** -0.009* -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.016*** -0.016*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 1056 1056 1034 946 946 1056 946
FS1970: Current Growth
Public Debt/GDP -0.009** -0.005* -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.019** 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013)
Observations 748 748 726 638 638 748 638
FS1970: Future Growth
Public Debt/GDP 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016)
Observations 748 748 726 638 638 748 638
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control: 1yr Lag Gwth Y Y
IV: 5yr Lag Debt Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Notes. Current growth and future 5-year average growth in real per capita GDP explained by the public debt-to-GDP
ratio. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels are
as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. FS1956 refers to the Full Sample of countries for 1956–2003; FS1970
refers to the Full Sample of countries for 1970–2003.
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Table 4: Public Debt and Current Growth: Regression Results by Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FS1956
Public Debt/GDP -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.007** -0.010 -0.007 -0.025*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 1056 1056 1034 946 946 1056 946
RR1955
Public Debt/GDP -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.009** -0.010 -0.007 -0.025*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 931 931 908 824 822 931 824
CWR
Public Debt/GDP -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.012 0.039
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.018) (0.026)
Observations 335 335 323 275 275 335 275
CMZ
Public Debt/GDP -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.173
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014) (0.119)
Observations 342 342 324 252 252 342 252
WK
Public Debt/GDP 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.022
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.022)
Observations 522 522 504 432 432 522 432
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control: 1yr Lag Gwth Y Y
IV: 5yr Lag Debt Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Notes. Current growth in real GDP explained by the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Robust standard errors, clustered
by country, in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels are as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Table 5: Public Debt and Future Growth: Regression Results by Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FS1956
Public Debt/GDP -0.014*** -0.009* -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.016*** -0.016*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 1056 1056 1034 946 946 1056 946
RR1955
Public Debt/GDP -0.013* -0.011* -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.019*** -0.012
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 929 929 905 825 822 929 825
CWR
Public Debt/GDP 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.056***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 335 335 323 275 275 335 275
CMZ
Public Debt/GDP 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.019* 0.074*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.040)
Observations 342 342 324 252 252 342 252
WK
Public Debt/GDP 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.016
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.021)
Observations 522 522 504 432 432 522 432
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control: 1yr Lag Gwth Y Y
IV: 5yr Lag Debt Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Notes. Future 5-year average growth in real GDP explained by the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Robust
standard errors,clustered by country, in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels are as
follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Table 6: First-Stage Results for IV Specifications
Current Growth 5 Year Future Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FS1956
L5.Public Debt/GDP 0.879*** 0.873*** 0.837*** 0.879*** 0.873*** 0.837***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.064) (0.047) (0.048) (0.064)
Observations 946 946 946 946 946 946
F-Stat 347 329 172 347 329 172
RR1955
L5.Public Debt/GDP 0.885*** 0.877*** 0.865*** 0.886*** 0.877*** 0.865***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.048) (0.038) (0.039) (0.048)
Observations 824 822 824 825 822 825
F-Stat 542 501 326 543 501 326
CWR
L5.Public Debt/GDP 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.735*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.735***
(0.046) (0.022) (0.185) (0.046) (0.022) (0.185)
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275
F-Stat 456 1969 16 456 1969 16
CMZ
L5.Public Debt/GDP 0.893*** 0.899*** 0.260* 0.893*** 0.899*** 0.260*
(0.070) (0.059) (0.155) (0.070) (0.059) (0.155)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252
F-Stat 165 233 3 165 233 3
WK
L5.Public Debt/GDP 1.000*** 1.002*** 0.574*** 1.000*** 1.002*** 0.574***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.140) (0.057) (0.058) (0.140)
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432
F-Stat 303 299 17 303 299 17
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Notes. Future 5-year average growth in real GDP explained by the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Ro-
bust standard errors,clustered by country, in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance
levels are as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Table 7: Public Debt and Future Growth: Regression Results for Expanded Sample of High Income OECD Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HI1955
Public Debt/GDP -0.016*** -0.014** -0.011** -0.015* -0.013** -0.010 -0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 1238 1238 1206 1079 1078 1238 1079
HIXEE1955
Public Debt/GDP -0.015*** -0.011* -0.008* -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 1178 1178 1152 1049 1048 1178 1049
HI1970
Public Debt/GDP -0.007 -0.011* -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 0.007 0.019
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
Observations 904 904 872 745 744 904 745
HIXEE1970
Public Debt/GDP -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 0.007 0.020
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016)
Observations 844 844 818 715 714 844 715
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control: 1yr Lag Gwth Y Y
IV: 5yr Lag Debt Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Notes. Future 5-year average growth in real GDP explained by the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Robust
standard errors,clustered by country, in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels are as
follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Table 8: Public Debt and Future Growth: Regression Results for Di erent Subsamples of RR1955
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year>=1955
Public Debt/GDP -0.013* -0.011* -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 -0.019***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 929 929 905 822 825 825 929
Year>=1960
Public Debt/GDP -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.010 -0.016**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 841 841 818 734 737 737 841
Year>=1965
Public Debt/GDP -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.014*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Observations 751 751 728 644 647 647 751
Year>=1970
Public Debt/GDP -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 661 661 638 556 559 559 661
Year Fixed E ects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control: 1yr Lag Gwth Y Y
IV: 5yr Lag Debt Y Y Y
Country Fixed E ects Y Y
Notes. Future 5-year average growth in real GDP explained by the public debt-to-GDP ratio. For
references to the datasets see Section 2.3. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses
below parameter estimates. Significance levels are as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: Replication of Regression Results in Cecchetti et al. (2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls Excluded, Country FE Excluded
Public Debt/GDP -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 342 342 324 306
Controls Excluded, Country FE Included
Public Debt/GDP 0.019* -0.007 0.020* -0.000
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004)
Observations 342 342 324 306
Controls Included, Country FE Excluded
Public Debt/GDP 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 342 342 324 306
Controls Included, Country FE Included
Public Debt/GDP 0.009 -0.016*** 0.008 -0.000
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 342 342 324 306
Year FE Y Y Y Y
1-Lag GDP Y Y
2 Lags of GDP Y
1-Lag Growth of GDP Y
Notes. Future 5-year average growth in real per capita GDP explained by the public debt-
to-GDP ratio. Additional controls include the variables used by CMZ: savings, growth of
population, years of schooling, trade openness, the rate of inflation, dependency ratio, and
liquid liabilities. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, appear in parentheses below
parameter estimates. Significance levels are as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Prevalence of high public debt, Full Sample
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Notes. The figure shows the count of countries out of the 22 countries in the Full Sample with public debt-to-GDP ratio above 60 percent or
above 90 percent between 1955 and 2010.
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Figure 2: Interquartile range of real per capita GDP growth, Full Sample
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Notes. The figure shows the interquartile range of real per capita GDP growth among the 22 countries in the Full Sample between 1955 and
2010.
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Figure 3: Coe cient on Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio with Alternative Windows
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Notes. The plot shows coe cients from regressions of real GDP growth on current public debt when the time window for averaging GDP growth
varies from $-5$ to $+5$ years. When the dependent variable is contemporaneous or forwarded growth, alternative controls for lagged growth
include no control and controls for 1- and 5-year lagged growth. All specifications include year dummies. Filled markers indicate statistical
significance at the 5 percent level with country-clustered standard errors. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Figure 3: Coe cient on Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio with Alternative Windows (continued)
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Notes. The plot shows coe cients from regressions of real GDP growth on current public debt when the time window for averaging GDP growth
varies from $-5$ to $+5$ years. When the dependent variable is contemporaneous or forwarded growth, alternative controls for lagged growth
include no control and controls for 1- and 5-year lagged growth. All specifications include year dummies. Filled markers indicate statistical
significance at the 5 percent level with country-clustered standard errors. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Figure 3: Coe cient on Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio with Alternative Windows (continued)
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Notes. The plot shows coe cients from regressions of real GDP growth on current public debt when the time window for averaging GDP growth
varies from $-5$ to $+5$ years. When the dependent variable is contemporaneous or forwarded growth, alternative controls for lagged growth
include no control and controls for 1- and 5-year lagged growth. All specifications include year dummies. Filled markers indicate statistical
significance at the 5 percent level with country-clustered standard errors. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Figure 4: Public Debt-Growth Lowess Plots
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In each row,
the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel, between
contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following five years
in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 4: Public Debt-Growth Lowess Plots (continued)
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In each row,
the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel, between
contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following five years
in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 4: Public Debt-Growth Lowess Plots (continued)
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In each row,
the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel, between
contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following five years
in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 5: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth.
Left panel shows the model with 1-lagged growth and year fixed e ects; right panel shows the model with country and year fixed e ects. FS1956
refers to the Full Sample 1956--2003; FS1970 refers to the Full Sample 1970--2003. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 6: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression Controlling for Lagged Growth
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
controlling for one-year lagged real GDP growth and including year dummies. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. Bootstrapped
confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 7: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression with Country Fixed E ects
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
including country and year dummies. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 8: Public Debt-Growth Lowess with Scatterplot
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and real GDP growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In
each row, the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel,
between contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following
five years in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 8: Public Debt-Growth Lowess with Scatterplot (continued)
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and real GDP growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In
each row, the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel,
between contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following
five years in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 8: Public Debt-Growth Lowess with Scatterplot (continued)
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and real GDP growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In
each row, the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel,
between contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following
five years in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 8: Public Debt-Growth Lowess with Scatterplot (continued)
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Notes. Lowess plots for the bivariate relationship between public debt and real GDP growth. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. In
each row, the relationship between contemporary public debt and average real GDP growth for the preceding five years is show in the left panel,
between contemporary public debt and contemporary real GDP growth in the center panel, between average real GDP growth for the following
five years in the right panel. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 9: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression Controlling for Lagged Growth with Scatterplot
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
controlling for one-year lagged real GDP growth and including year dummies. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. Bootstrapped
confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 10: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression with Country Fixed E ects with Scatterplot
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
including country and year dummies. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Figure 11: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression for RR1955, by pre/post-1965
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
controlling for one-year lagged real GDP growth and including year dummies. Future For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Figure 12: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression for CWR with \& without Ireland
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
controlling for one-year lagged real GDP growth and including year dummies. Future For references to the datasets see Section 2.3.
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Figure 13: Public Debt-Future Growth Partial Linear Regression with Country Fixed E ects for CWR with \& without Ireland
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Notes. Partial Linear Regression Residual Lowess plots for the relationship between public debt and five-year future average real GDP growth
including country and year dummies. For references to the datasets see Section 2.3. Bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 250 repetitions.
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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
This Online Appendix presents:
A. A formal derivation of conditions under which the bias in the estimate of the impact of
debt on growth is reduced by (1) using forwarded growth, (2) controlling for lagged
dependent variable, and (3) instrumenting public debt with lagged public debt.
B. Description of our dataset
C. A schematic of the spline specification used in Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Woo and
Kumar (2015) in Figure C.1
A Bias in Estimation of the Debt-Growth Relationship
A.1 Basic Setup
Let git and Dit denote de-meaned growth (annual growth rate of real gross domestic product)
and public debt (ratio of public debt to nominal gross domestic product) respectively. The
structural model of bi-directional causal relationships between growth and debt, i.e., the
“true” data generating process (DGP), is given by the following simultaneous equation model
Dit = a1git + vit (8)
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and
git = b1Dit + uit (9)
where the structural errors are distributed as vit ≥ (0,‡2v) with kth-order autocorrelation
coe cient flv(k), uit ≥ (0,‡2u) with kth-order autocorrelation coe cient flu(k), and for all
integers k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., E(vi,t+kui,t+k) = 0, where E(y) refers to the expected value of the
random variable, y.
The reduced form model corresponding to the structural model in (8) and (9) is given by
Dit =
;
a1
1≠ a1b1
<
uit +
; 1
1≠ a1b1
<
vit (10)
and
git =
; 1
1≠ a1b1
<
uit +
I
b1
1≠ a1b1
J
vit. (11)
We use the following notation: plim zn refers to the probability limit of the random variable
zn when the appropriate index, n, goes to infinity; |x| refers to the absolute value of a real
number x. Our maintained assumption throughout this paper is stated as
Assumption 1. For the model in (8) and (9), a1 < 0, b1 < 0, and a1b1 < 1.
Let bˆ1 denote the OLS estimator of b1 in (9) and let ⁄ = (‡2v/‡2u); then, assuming that
the relevant exogeneity conditions of the structural errors in (8) and (9) hold, we have
plim bˆ1 =
E(Ditgit)
E(D2it)
= a1 + b1⁄
a21 + ⁄
. (12)
The estimator bˆ1 in the above equation is indexed by the sample size and the probability limit
is computed with the sample size approaching infinity. But here, and below, we suppress
explicit indexing with the sample size for notational simplicity.
Using the above expression for the OLS estimator of b1, we can see that the bias of the
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OLS estimator (due to reverse causality) is given by
plim bˆ1 ≠ b1 = a1(1≠ a1b1)
a21 + ⁄
< 0, (13)
where the inequality holds because of assumption 1. Hence, bias in the OLS estimator is
negative, i.e., the “true” impact of debt on growth is smaller in magnitude than what the
OLS estimator shows.
A.2 Conditions for Bias Reduction
Let Âb1 be an estimator of b1 arrived at using some specification other than (9) or some
method other than OLS. We are interested in understanding the conditions under which this
alternative specification (or method) takes us closer to the “true” parameter b1 from below,
i.e., while the direction of asymptotic bias in Âb1 remains the same as for the OLS estimator
bˆ1, i.e., negative, its magnitude is reduced. This would be ensured when plim Âb1 is bounded
from below by the probability limit of the OLS estimator and from above by the “true” value
of the parameter, i.e.,
plim bˆ1 < plim Âb1 < b1. (14)
We limit ourselves to downward biased estimators because our analysis suggests that the
e ect of debt on growth is less negative than claimed in the extant literature. The opposite
case, where estimators could be upward biased, is of limited interest to us.
While we derive conditions for bias reduction in terms of the correlation coe cients of
the two error terms - the error term in the growth and in the debt equation, we illustrate
these conditions for a specific case: when the error terms for the growth and debt equations
follow stable AR(1) processes with AR coe cients, „u and „v respectively. For each method,
we illustrate the condition for bias reduction by depicting the locus of („u,„v) on the unit
square for which bias is reduced, i.e., the approach improves on OLS if („u,„v) falls in the
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shaded range. We generate Figure 14 with plausible values for a, b, and ⁄: a = ≠20, which
implies that a severe recession with growth of -4 percent per year generates debt of 80 percent;
b = ≠0.012, which implies that a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 100 percent generates a severe
recession with growth of -1.2 percent per year; and ⁄ = 16, under the supposition that a
standard deviation of public debt is 8 percentage points of GDP and the standard deviation
of GDP growth is 2 percentage points.
B Bias Reduction in Alternative Strategies
We will use the general conditions listed above in (14) to derive su cient conditions for
reduction in the magnitude of the negative bias in alternative estimation strategies.
B.1 k-period Forwarding of Growth
Let k be any positive integer. Many papers in the emerging literature on the growth-debt
relationship use forwarding of the dependent variable (growth) to reduce the bias due to reverse
causality. While it might be intuitively clear that forwarding reduces the bias, we would
like to investigate the question more rigorously here and ask: under what conditions does
k-period forwarding of the dependent variable in (9) reduce the bias in the OLS estimator?
To proceed, note that with k-period forwarding of the dependent variable, the following
equation is estimated
gi,t+k = b11Dit + Áit. (15)
instead of (9). Let bˆ11 be the OLS estimator of b11 in (15); then we have
plim bˆ11 =
E(Ditgt+k)
E(D2it)
= a1flu(k) + b1⁄flv(k)
a21 + ⁄
(16)
where the second equality comes from using the expression for Dit and gi,t+k corresponding
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to the “true” DGP in (8) and (9), and
flv(k) =
E(vitvi,t+k)
‡2v
is the k-th order autocorrelation coe cient in vit, and
flu(k) =
E(uitui,t+k)
‡2u
is the k-th order autocorrelation coe cient in uit. We assume that the structural errors, uit
and vit, have non-negative autocorrelation coe cients and state this as
Assumption 2. For all j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., flv(j) Ø 0 and flu(j) Ø 0.
Proposition 1. If assumption 1 and 2 holds, and
a1 {flu(k)≠ a1b1} < b1⁄ {1≠ flv(k)} (17)
then k-period forwarding reduces bias from below, i.e., plim bˆ1 < plim bˆ11 < b1.
Proof. Since ⁄ > 0, 0 Ø flu(k) Ø 1, 0 Ø flv(k) Ø 1, a1 < 0 and b1 < 0, we have a1flu(k) > a1
and b1⁄flv(k) > b1⁄, so that
a1 + b1⁄ < a1flu(k) + b1⁄flv(k)
and hence that
plim bˆ1 =
a1 + b1⁄
a21 + ⁄
<
a1flu(k) + b1⁄flv(k)
a21 + ⁄
= plim bˆ11
using the expressions in (12) and (16). Thus, the probability limit of the alternative estimator
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is bounded from below by the OLS estimator. To see the upper bound, note that if
a1 {flu(k)≠ a1b1} < b1⁄ {1≠ flv(k)}
then
a1flu(k) + b1⁄flv(k) < b1a21 + b1⁄
so that
plim bˆ11 =
a1flu(k) + b1⁄flv(k)
a21 + ⁄
< b1.
This completes the proof.
To get some intuitive understanding of the result in proposition 1, let us compare the
expressions for the OLS estimator in (12) and the k-period forwarded estimator in (16). Note
two extreme cases regarding the magnitudes of the autocorrelations in the structural errors:
(a) when the autocorrelations tend towards unity from below, i.e., (flu(k), flv(k)) ø (1, 1), the
k-period forwarded estimator collapses to the OLS estimator; (b) when the autocorrelations
tend towards zero from above, i.e., (flu(k), flv(k)) ¿ (0, 0), the k-period forwarded estimator
tends towards zero (which leads to positive bias, because the true parameter is negative, i.e.,
b1 < 0). Hence the k-period forwarded estimator reduces the magnitude of the negative bias
when the autocorrelations in the two structural errors are bounded away su ciently strongly
from the extreme values of 0 and 1, i.e., the errors need to be correlated with its past values
but not too strongly. The condition in (17) gives the precise way in which this bounding away
is needed to achieve reduction in bias from below. Since, 0 < flu(k), flv(k) < 1, combinations
of these two autocorrelations, i.e., (flu(k), flv(k)), fall in the unit square on the positive part
of the 2D plane. The condition in (17) defines the subset of this unit square which would be
consistent with reduction in the magnitude of the negative bias.
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B.2 k-period Average Forwarding
For any variable xit, let k-period average forwarding be denoted by Âxit, i.e.,
Âxit = 1
k
k≠1ÿ
j=0
xi,t+j.
With k-period average forwarding of the dependent variable, instead of (9), the following
equation is estimated,
Âgi,t+k = b12Dit + Áit. (18)
Let bˆ12 be the OLS estimator of b12 in (18), and let
Âflv(k) = (1/k)
Y][
k≠1ÿ
j=0
flv(j)
Z^
\ = (1/k)
Y][1 +
k≠1ÿ
j=1
flv(j)
Z^
\ ,
and
Âflu(k) = (1/k)
Y][
k≠1ÿ
j=0
flu(j)
Z^
\ = (1/k)
Y][1 +
k≠1ÿ
j=1
flu(j)
Z^
\ ;
then we have
plim bˆ12 =
E(DitÂgi,t+k)
E(D2it)
= a1
Âflv(k) + b1⁄Âflu(k)
a21 + ⁄
(19)
Proposition 2. If assumption 1 holds, and
a1 {Âflu(k)≠ a1b1} < b1⁄ {1≠ Âflv(k)} (20)
then k-period average forwarding reduces bias from below, i.e., plim bˆ1 < plim bˆ12 < b1.
Proof. The proof follows the same logic as the proof of the previous proposition when flv(k)
and flu(k) are replaced with Âflv(k) and Âflu(k), respectively.
Equation 19 gives insight into the e ectiveness of the approach of average forwarding for
recovering the true value of b1. If flu(k) and flv(k) are both close to one, the estimate of b1
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based on k-period average forwarding approaches the OLS estimate, plim bˆ12 = plimbˆ1, and
average forwarding is, like OLS, negatively biased. If flu(k) and flv(k) are both close to zero,
the estimate of b1 based on k-period average forwarding approaches zero, i.e., plim bˆ12 = 0,
and assuming b1 < 0, average forwarding is positively biased. This result is not surprising
because the average forwarding estimator focuses on the persistent component of growth in
GDP. If there is little persistent component, i.e., flu(k) = 0, then the approach does not yield
useful results. For intermediate values of flu(k) and flv(k), average forwarding will recover
the true value of b1.
We can illustrate these conditions for bias reduction with a specific example. Suppose u
and v both follow AR(1) processes so that
uit = „uui,t≠1 + ‘1it and vit = „vvi,t≠1 + ‘2it, where |„u| < 1, and |„v| < 1 so that the
AR(1) processes are stable. Then, if we use 5-year average forwarding, the condition for bias
reduction, 20, becomes a1
Ó
1≠„5u
5(1≠„u) ≠ a1b1
Ô
≠ b1⁄
Ó
1≠ 1≠„5v5(1≠„v)
Ô
< 0.
In the upper left-hand panel of Figure 14, we plot the function F („u,„v) = a1
Ó
1≠„5u
5(1≠„u) ≠ a1b1
Ô
≠
b1⁄
Ó
1≠ 1≠„5v5(1≠„v)
Ô
on the unit square, using the following parameter values a1 = ≠20, b1 =
≠0.012,⁄ = 16 , and indicate the region on the unit square where the value of the function is
negative. This area represents the combination of („u,„v) for which the estimator based on
the use of Average Forward Growth as the dependent variable improves on the OLS estimate
(with contemporaneous growth as the dependent variable).
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B.3 Lagged Debt as an IV for Current Debt
In this case, we estimate (9) using Di,t≠5 as an instrument for Dit.14 Let bˆ13 be the IV
estimator for b1 in (9). We have,
plim bˆ13 =
E(gitDi,t≠5)
E(DitDi,t≠5)
= a1flu(5) + b1⁄flv(5)
a21flu(5) + ⁄flv(5)
= a1 + b1⁄Ê(5)
a21 + ⁄Ê(5)
(21)
where Ê(5) = (flv(5)/flu(5)) is the ratio of the autocorrelation coe cients of order 5.
Proposition 3. If assumption 1 and 2 holds, and Ê(5) > 1, then using Di,t≠5 as an
instrument for Dit in (9) reduces the bias from below, i.e., plim bˆ1 < plim bˆ13 < b1.
Proof. Note that the upper bound is always satisfied, because a1 < 0 and a1b1 < 1 implies
that
plim bˆ13 =
a1 + b1⁄Ê(5)
a21 + ⁄Ê(5)
< b1.
To see that the lower bound is satisfied note that Ê(5) > 1 implies
a1⁄ {1≠ Ê(5)} (1≠ a1b1) > 0
so that
a1⁄ {1≠ Ê(5)} > ⁄a21b1 {1≠ Ê(5)} .
Adding a31 + b1⁄2Ê(5) to both sides of the above we get
{a1 + b1⁄Ê(5)}
Ó
a21 + ⁄
Ô
> {a1 + b1⁄}
Ó
a21 + ⁄Ê(5)
Ô
which shows that
plim bˆ1 =
a1 + b1⁄
a21 + ⁄
<
a1 + b1⁄Ê(5)
a21 + ⁄Ê(5)
= plim bˆ13 (22)
14We have used the 5-th lag because that has been used in the literature. There is no reason why one could
not use any other lag. The results derived here are valid for any lag, k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
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This completes the proof.
An intuitive understanding of the result in proposition 3 can be obtained if we re-write
the expression for the IV estimator in (21) as
plim bˆ13 =
E(gitDi,t≠5)
E(DitDi,t≠5)
= a1 + b1⁄Ê(5)
a21 + ⁄Ê(5)
= [a1/Ê(5)] + b1⁄[a21/Ê(5)] + ⁄
.
Consider two extreme cases. First, when Ê(5) = 1, i.e., when the 5th order autocorrelation
coe cient in error term in the growth equation and the debt equation are the same, the IV
estimator collapses to the OLS estimator, i.e.,
plim bˆ13 = plim bˆ1.
Second, when Ê(5) becomes large, the IV estimator converges to the “true” value of the
underlying parameter, i.e., when Ê(5)æŒ
plim bˆ13 = b1.
Thus, we can see that the crucial condition that reduces the magnitude of the negative bias
in the IV estimator is the relative magnitude of the autocorrelation coe cients of the error
term in the growth equation, uit, and the error term in the debt equation, vit.
What is the intuition here? Since the IV estimator is the ratio of the reduced form and the
first stage partial e ects, the numerator in the expression above captures the reduced form
e ect of lagged debt on contemporary growth, and the denominator captures the first stage
e ect of lagged debt on contemporary debt. From the numerator we see that the reduced
form e ect is a weighted average of a1 and b1, with relative magnitudes of autocorrelation
coe cients and variances functioning as weights.15 When the magnitude of the autocorrelation
15To be more precise, the reduced form e ect is the numerator divided by the variance of Di,t≠5. But since
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coe cient for uit (error in the growth equation) increases relative to vit (error term in the
debt equation), then the contribution of a1 (the reverse causal e ect of growth on debt) to
the reduced form e ect falls, i.e., the confounding e ect of the reverse casual relationship is
neutralized better by the IV.
In one extreme case, when autocorrelation coe cient of uit (error in the growth equation)
is the same as the the autocorrelation coe cient of vit (error term in the debt equation),
the IV is useless because the confounding e ect of the reverse causal e ect is in full force.
In the other extreme case, when the autocorrelation coe cient of uit (error in the growth
equation) is infinitely larger than the the autocorrelation coe cient of vit (error term in the
debt equation), the confounding e ect of the reverse causal channel is perfectly tamed, and
the IV estimator takes us to the “true” value.
To summarize the relationship between the autocorrelation parameters of the data-
generating process and the e ectiveness of IV as an identification strategy, we observe
that when the ratio flu(5)/flv(5) is approximately one, the IV estimate approaches the OLS
estimates, i.e., plim bˆ13 = plim bˆ1. When the ratio flu(5)/flv(5) is large, then the IV estimate
approaches the true value of b1, i.e., plim bˆ13 = b1. Intuition for this result follows from
the standard conditions for identification with instrumental variables. There must be some
correlation between the excluded exogenous instrument and the endogenous regressor, i.e.,
flv(5) cannot be too small, but the correlation cannot be so strong that we fail to break the
endogenous relationship, i.e., the excluded exogenous instrument must not be as bad as the
endogenous regressor.
Continuing with our example of AR(1) errors, the condition for bias reduction becomes:
„5u ≠ „5v < 0.
In the lower left-hand panel of Figure 14, we plot the function, F („u,„v) = „5u ≠ „5v, on
the unit square (with the same parameter values as in the upper left figure) and indicate the
this variance is a constant, one can consider it as a normalization factor.
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area on the unit square for which the IV estimator improves on the OLS estimate (and the
value of the function is negative).
6.4 Lagged Growth as an Additional Control
In this case we estimate the following model
git = b14Dit + b2gi,t≠1 + Áit (23)
instead of (9). Let bˆ14 be the OLS estimator of b14 in (23); then
plim bˆ14 =
E
1
g2i,t≠1
2
E (Ditgit)≠ E (Ditgi,t≠1)E (gitgi,t≠1)
E
1
g2i,t≠1
2
E (D2it)≠ E (Ditgi,t≠1)E (Ditgi,t≠1)
. (24)
The expression for the probability limit of bˆ14 can be simplified to the following:
plim bˆ14 =
(a1 + b1⁄)≠ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
(a21 + ⁄)≠ 11+b21⁄ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
2 . (25)
Proposition 4. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and if
a1 [1≠ flu(1)] + b1 [1≠ flv(1)] < a21b1 + b1⁄≠
b1
1 + b21⁄
[a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]2 (26)
then using gi,t≠1 as an additional control reduces the bias from below, i.e., plim bˆ1 < plim bˆ14 <
b1.
Proof. Since [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄] < 0, and (1 + b21⁄) > 0,
plim bˆ1 =
(a1 + b1⁄)
(a21 + ⁄)
<
(a1 + b1⁄)≠ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
(a21 + ⁄)≠ 11+b21⁄ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
2 = plim bˆ14
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so that the lower bound is always satisfied. On the other hand if
a1 [1≠ flu(1)] + b1 [1≠ flv(1)] < a21b1 + b1⁄≠
b1
1 + b21⁄
[a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]2
then
a1 [1≠ flu(1)] + b1 [1≠ flv(1)] <
I
a21 + ⁄≠
1
1 + b21⁄
[a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]2
J
b1
The expression in the braces on the RHS is positive because
1
a21 + ⁄
2 1
1 + b21⁄
2
> [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]2 .
Hence, we can divide through by the expression in the braces to get
plim bˆ14 =
(a1 + b1⁄)≠ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
(a21 + ⁄)≠ 11+b21⁄ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
2 < b1
This completes the proof.
To understand the intuition behind the result in proposition 4 let us re-write the expression
for the estimator in (25) as
plim bˆ14 =
a1 [1≠ flu(1)] + b1⁄ [1≠ flv(1)]
(a21 + ⁄)≠ 11+b21⁄ [a1flu(1) + b1flv(1)⁄]
2 (27)
Consider two extreme cases. First, when flu(1) = flv(1) = 1, the estimator converges to
0, which gives a positively biased estimate (because the “true” value of the parameter is
negative, i.e., b1 < 0). Second, when flu(1) = flv(1) = 0, the estimator coincides with the OLS
estimator, bˆ1. Thus, for the estimator bˆ14 to reduce the magnitude of the negative bias, the
autocorrelation in the error terms must be bounded away from the extreme values of 0 and 1,
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which is analogous to the case of k-period forwarding that we discussed in proposition 1. The
expression in (26) gives the precise domain of values of the combination of autocorrelations,
(flu(1), flv(1)), on the unit square on the positive part of the 2D plane that is needed to ensure
the reduction in the magnitude of the negative bias.
One way to get a better intuitive grasp of the issues here is to use a “partialling out”
interpretation of the estimator bˆ14. Using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem, bˆ14 is the OLS
estimator from a regression of contemporary growth, git, on the residual obtained from an
auxiliary regression of contemporary debt, Dit, on lagged growth, gi,t≠1. Hence, the numerator
of the expression in (25) is the covariance of contemporary growth with the residual, and
the denominator is the variance of the residual. Comparing the expression in (25) with the
analogous expression in (12), we see that that the numerator increases (becomes less negative)
and the denominator increases. Intuitively, including lagged growth as an additional control
has two e ects (if the conditions stated in proposition 4 are satisfied): first, it soaks up some
of the variation in the error term in (9) leading to a lower variance in the resulting error
term; and second, it makes the covariance between contemporary growth and the residual
of the auxiliary regression less negative than the covariance of contemporary growth and
contemporary debt. The net result is that inclusion of a lagged growth term, under these
conditions, reduces the magnitude of the negative bias.
Equation 27 gives insight into the conditions of e ectiveness of the approach of controlling
for lagged growth for recovering the true value of b1. If flu(1) and flv(1) are both close to 1,
the estimate of b1 based on controlling for lagged growth approaches zero, i.e., plim bˆ14 = 0,
and assuming b1 < 0, average forwarding is positively biased. If flu(1) and flv(1) are both
close to zero, the estimate of b1 based on controlling for lagged growth approaches the OLS
estimate, plim bˆ14 = plim bˆ1, and controlling for lagged growth is, like OLS, negatively biased.
This result is not surprising because the estimator controlling for lagged growth focuses
identification on growth innovations. If there is little innovation, i.e., flu(1) = 1, then the
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approach does not yield useful results. For lower values of flu(1) and flv(1), controlling for
lagged growth will recover the true value of b1.
Continuing with our example of AR(1) errors, the condition for bias reduction, 26,
becomes:
a1 [1≠ „u] + b1 [1≠ „v]≠ a21b1 ≠ b1⁄+ b11+b21⁄ [a1„u + b1⁄„v]
2 < 0
In the upper right-hand panel of Figure 14, we plot, using the same parameter values
as used in the other figures, the function F („u,„v) = a1 [1≠ „u] + b1 [1≠ „v]≠ a21b1 ≠ b1⁄+
b1
1+b21⁄
[a1„u + b1⁄„v]2 on the unit square, and indicate the combination of („u,„v) for which
the value of the function is negative, and hence the estimator based on the inclusion of a
Lagged Growth Control improves on the OLS estimate without the Lagged Growth Control.
C Taking Stock of the Bias Reduction Strategies
The lower-right panel of Figure 14 shows the alternative loci for which the three identification
approaches improve on the OLS estimates. With our plausible values of a = ≠20, b = ≠0.012,
and ⁄ = 16, the intersection of the loci — the area in which all three of the methods, Lagged
Growth Control, Average Forward Growth, and Instrumental Variables, yield improvements
over the OLS estimate (which is represented by the dark shaded trapezoid-like region) —
occupies a substantial share of the unit square.
But the implication of the bias-reduction analysis is stronger. As we note above, the Lagged
Growth Control and the Average Forward Growth approaches focus identification on di erent
parts of the data-generating process. Controlling for lagged growth focuses identification of
the e ect of debt on innovations in growth, i.e., persistent growth is controlled for via the
inclusion of the lag. Average Forward Growth focuses identification on the persistent portion
of growth, i.e., the accumulation of growth over a five-year period. These alternative focuses
imply di erent responses of the estimator to alternative values of („u,„v).
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The Lagged Growth Control and Average Forward Growth estimators have the convenient
property that they reduce bias (or are biased towards zero) under opposite assumptions about
„u. As the upper-left panel of Figure 14 illustrates, Average Forward Growth, focused on the
persistent component, performs better when „u is relatively high and will be biased toward
zero only if „u is relatively low. As the upper-right panel of Figure 14 shows, the Lagged
Growth Control, focused on innovations, performs better when „u is relatively low and will
be biased toward zero only if „u is relatively high.
The combination means that it cannot be that both of them are biased towards zero
(under the data-generating process). If both reduce the magnitude of the estimate vis-à-vis
the baseline OLS estimate—which is the case empirically—then the reduced magnitude
constitutes an improvement on the baseline OLS, and cannot a result of specific conditions
on („u,„v) that bias the estimate toward zero. That is, the similarity of the estimates for
the Lagged Growth Control and the Average Forward Growth specification in the empirical
analysis imply that the likely values of („u,„v) are in the intersection of the zones where
each strategy reduces bias.
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Figure 14: Conditions for Bias Reduction
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Locus of (φu, φv) s.t. Average Forward Growth improves on OLS
φu (growth AR1)
φv (debt AR1)
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Locus of (φu, φv) s.t. Lagged Growth Control improves on OLS
φu (growth AR1)
φv (debt AR1)
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
Locus of (φu, φv) s.t. IV with Lagged Debt improves on OLS
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1φu (growth AR1) 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
φv (debt AR1)
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Locus of (φu, φv) s.t. method improves on OLS
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
φu (growth AR1)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
φ v
 (d
eb
t A
R1
)
Notes. The panels illustrate the e ect of each of three bias reduction strategies and, in the lower-right panel,
the intersection of the three approaches. For Average Forward Growth (the upper-left panel), the shaded
locus of improvement („u,„v) is derived from Equation 20. For Lagged Growth Control (the upper-right
panel), the shaded locus of improvement („u,„v) is derived from Equation 26. For Instrumental Variables
(the lower-left panel), the shaded locus of improvement („u,„v) is derived from Equation 22. These figures
were produced using the following values: a = ≠20, b = ≠0.012,⁄ = 16, and under the assumption that the
error terms in the growth and debt equations follow AR(1) processes with coe cients „u and „v respectively.
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Appendix B Data Appendix
In this appendix, we describe our various data sources in greater detail. A word about the
two datasets derived from Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) is in order. Reinhart and Rogo 
published related public-use data on their website, but the actual data used in Reinhart and
Rogo  (2010) were made available by Reinhart and Rogo  to the authors of Herndon et al.
(2014) in spreadsheet format. Herndon et al. released a data and code package based on these
data from their website, and this release forms the basis of our analysis. This dataset covers
the time period 1946–2009 and includes the 20 countries indicated in column 2 of Table 2.
Following the authors’ recommendation in Reinhart and Rogo  (2013), we use a subset of
these data that limits the data to 1955–2003 and refer to this dataset as RR1955. In the
data from Reinhart and Rogo , public debt is measured as gross central government debt as
a percentage of GDP, and growth is measured as the annual growth rate of real GDP (not
per capita).
The dataset for Cecchetti et al. (2011) was downloaded from the website of the Bank
of International Settlements.16 This data set, which we call CMZ, covers the 18 countries
indicated in column 2 of Table 2 for the period 1980–2009. As explained in Cecchetti et al.
(2011), the data come either from the OECD website or from national sources. In this dataset,
public debt is measured as gross liabilities of general government valued at market prices on
a non-consolidated basis (as a percentage of GDP), and growth is measured as the annual
growth rate of per capita real GDP. Other variables, e.g., school enrollment and the level of
real GDP, were included on separate spreadsheets.
We reconstructed the dataset for Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) by downloading
data from the Annual macro-economic database (AMECO) website of the European Commis-
sion’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial A airs (DG ECFIN) for the following
16See http://www.bis.org/publ/work352.htm.
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variables: (1) per capita real GDP (gross domestic product at 2010 reference levels per
head of population), (2) gross public debt as a percentage of GDP (i.e., general government
consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP at current prices).17 This data set, which
we call CWR, runs over the period 1970–2008 and includes the 12 countries indicated in
column 3 of Table 2. In CWR, public debt is measured as general government consolidated
gross debt, and growth is measured as the annual growth rate of per capita real GDP.
We also attempted to reconstruct the advanced economies dataset used by Woo and
Kumar (2015). Although Woo and Kumar (2015) cites the IMF World Economic Outlook
(WEO) data, the version that we found on the IMF website includes the key macroeconomic
and fiscal variables for all countries but all data are limited to 1980–present, while Woo and
Kumar (2015) presents results for 1970–present. We reconstructed the data, which we refer
to as WK, by merging the WEO data (WEOOct2015all, the set available from the IMF
website in October 2015) with data from the Penn World Tables version 7.0 (Heston et al.,
2011) and data on fiscal variables for all countries from 1800–present from the IMF Public
Finances in Modern History Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy Database (Mauro et al., 2013).18
17 Data were downloaded on 4/14/2016 from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/
SelectSerie.cfm.
18In no case were the data archived for replication by the journals or authors. Requests for replication data
to the corresponding authors for Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Woo and Kumar (2015) did not
receive a response. Access to the data for Reinhart and Rogo  (2010) is discussed in Herndon et al. (2014).
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Figure C.1: Schematic of Spline Specifications
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Notes. The diagram illustrates two commonly used spline specifications and the partially constrained spline specification used in Woo and
Kumar (2015) and Cecchetti et al. (2011). In the top specification, the spline is knotted at the break point to permit a continuous function with
a change in slope. In the middle specification, both a discontinuity and a change in slope are permitted. In the third specification, the two
segments are constrained a single common intercept with the vertical axis.
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